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Abstract
We analyze the impact of status preferences on technological progress and long-run
economic growth within an R&D-based framework. For this purpose, we extend the standard
relative wealth approach by allowing the various assets held by households to differ with
respect to their status relevance. Relative wealth preferences imply that the effective rate of
return on saving in the form of a particular asset is the sum of its market rate of return and its
status-related extra return. We show that the status relevance of shares issued by entrants to
finance the purchase of new technologies is of crucial importance for long-run growth: First,
an increase in the intensity of the quest for status raises the steady-state economic growth
rate only if the status-related extra return of these shares is strictly positive. Second, for any
given degree of status consciousness, the long-run economic growth rate depends positively
on the relative status relevance of shares issued by entrants. Third, while the decentralized
long-run economic growth rate is less than its socially optimal counterpart in the standard
model, wealth externalities reduce this distortion.
JEL classification: D31, D62, O10, O30.
Keywords: Status concerns, relative wealth, technological progress, long-run economic
growth, social optimality.
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Wealth is like sea-water; the more we drink, the thirstier we become.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
1 Introduction
The idea that individuals derive utility not only from absolute consumption, leisure, or wealth
but also from their social status is by now well established. It has long been recognized that
individuals compare themselves with each other and that they derive extra felicity from out-
performing their peers. For example, Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations that “With
the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches”
and John Stuart Mill stated in his Essay on Social Freedom that “Men do not desire merely
to be rich, but to be richer than other men”. This all too human trait is also backed by em-
pirical evidence: Clark and Oswald (1998) and Luttmer (2005) find, by analyzing 5,000 British
workers and 8,000 US households, respectively, that self-reported happiness and life satisfaction
are lower if, ceteris paribus, neighbors an/or colleagues are better off. Their results are statisti-
cally and economically significant and robust against various re-specifications of the regressions.
Luttmer (2005) concludes that the most promising explanation for his result is the presence of a
psychological externality that leads individuals to derive utility from their own status in relation
to the status of others. For further empirical support of status concerns see McBride (2001)
and Boyce et al. (2010).
In theoretical macroeconomic models, the implications of the quest for status on private
consumption, saving, work effort, and the optimal design of distortionary taxation/subsidization
have been analyzed extensively.1 With respect to the analysis of long-run economic growth,
however, status-related models did not yet lead to substantially new insights. The reason
is that status preferences have no impact on the long-run balanced growth path in standard
neoclassical growth models, regardless of whether status is determined by relative consumption
or by relative wealth. While AK type of growth models imply that status preferences of the
relative wealth type have an effect on long-run economic performance, i) many implications of
the AK model are refuted by the available empirical evidence (cf. Aghion and Howitt, 2009,
pp. 56–60) implying that it is not a suitable framework for the analysis of long-run economic
growth, ii) there is only one asset (physical capital) in the AK framework, which rules out growth
effects due to the possibility that individuals attach different status weights to different forms
of assets such as physical capital and shares, iii) AK models do not leave an explanatory role
for technological progress, which has been identified as the main driver of long-run economic
growth (Acemoglu, 2009, pp. 402–403). Nowadays, multi-sector R&D-based growth models
with two types of assets, physical capital and shares, are used to analyze the driving forces of
1For the relative consumption specification or more general specifications of consumption externalities see, for
example, Abel (1990, 2005), Gal´ı (1994), Harbough (1996), Carroll et al. (1997), Rauscher (1997), Grossmann
(1998), Fisher and Hof (2000), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Liu and Turnovsky (2005), Turnovsky and Monteiro
(2007), Fisher and Heijdra (2009), and Strulik (2015). For the relative wealth specification see, for example,
Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001a,b), Futagami and Shibata (1998), Fisher and Hof (2005, 2008), Van Long and
Shimomura (2004), and Fisher (2010). For frameworks that allow for both specifications see Tournemaine and
Tsoukis (2008), Ghosh and Wendner (2014), Ghosh and Wendner (2015), and Wendner (2015).
2
technological change and long-run economic growth. We therefore aim to extend this literature
to adequately capture the impact of the quest for status on long-run economic performance.
The contribution of our paper is twofold: First, we close an important gap in the literature by
introducing relative wealth preferences into the generic R&D-based growth model of the Romer
(1990) type and by analyzing the implications of status concerns for technological progress
and growth. To the best of our knowledge this has not been attempted before. Using a
semi-endogenous growth model of the Jones (1995) type instead of the Romer (1990) type
would not change the basic mechanisms and channels that we identify because all of our results
would be present during the transition toward the long-run balanced growth path.2 Second,
we extend the standard relative wealth approach by allowing for the possibility that the assets
held by households differ with respect to their status relevance. This extension is inspired by
psychological research on whether various categories of items differ with respect to their degree
of positionality.3 As we will see, the differential status effect of traditional physical capital
versus those of shares used by entrants to purchase new technologies is of crucial importance
for long-run economic growth and has the potential to explain the superior growth patterns of
countries in which entrants/startups have better access to new funds.
The introduction of generalized relative wealth preferences into the Romer (1990) model
implies that the effective rate of return on saving in the form of a particular asset is the sum
of its standard market rate of return and its status-related extra return. In both the Euler
equation for consumption and in the no-arbitrage condition, the rental rate of physical capital
and the market rate of return of shares issued by entrants are replaced by the corresponding
effective rates of return. Hence, the status-seeking motive leads to a rise in the common steady-
state effective rate of return of all assets as long as the positive effects of the status-related
extra returns are not perfectly offset by the decrease in the market rates of return associated
with a higher saving rate. The resulting stronger incentive to save causes the demand for both
physical capital and shares issued by entrants to grow at a higher rate. Since the purchase of
new technologies by entrants is financed through equity, this raises the demand for R&D. The
faster-growing demand for new technologies is in turn satisfied by an increase in employment
in the research sector, which leads to an acceleration of technological progress and to faster
economic growth.
The main implications of the introduction of generalized relative wealth preferences can
be summarized as follows: First, an increase in the intensity of the quest for status raises the
steady-state economic growth rate as long as the possession of shares issued by entrants matters
for social status. If, however, solely the relative holdings of physical capital are status-relevant,
then the status-augmented Romer (1990) model yields the same long-run balanced growth rate
as the standard Romer (1990) model. Second, for any given degree of status consciousness
both the fraction of wealth held in the form of shares and the long-run economic growth rate
depend positively on the relative status weight of shares issued by entrants. Third, while in the
standard Romer (1990) model the decentralized long-run economic growth rate is less than its
2See Trimborn et al. (2008), and Prettner and Trimborn (2016) for the numerical analysis of the transitional
dynamics of semi-endogenous growth models.
3See for example Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005); Solnick et al. (2007), Johansson-Stenman and Martins-
son (2006), and Hillesheim and Mechtel (2013).
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socially optimal counterpart, the wealth externalities are able to counterbalance this distortion
provided that the effect of shares on status is large enough.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic assumptions with
respect to status preferences and derive the status-augmented versions of i) the Euler equation
for consumption, ii) the no-arbitrage condition with respect to the rates of return of physical
capital and shares issued by entrants, and iii) the transversality conditions of the representative
household’s optimization problem. In addition, we present the three sectors of the production
side of the economy and derive the system of differential equations that governs the dynamic
evolution of the economy. Section 3 contains the main results with respect to the impact of the
quest for status on long-run growth and with respect to the importance of the status-relevance
of shares in this context. In Section 4 we discuss the results and conclude.
2 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a modern knowledge-based economy with three sectors in the vein of Romer (1990)4:
final goods production, intermediate goods production, and R&D. These sectors employ two
production factors, physical capital and labor. Homogeneous labor is employed in the final goods
sector and in the R&D sector (for simplicity we refer to labor employed in final goods production
as “workers” and to labor employed in R&D as “scientists”). The final goods sector produces a
single homogeneous commodity that is used either as consumption good or as physical capital.
The varieties produced by the intermediate goods sector are used as inputs in the production
of the final good. The R&D sector develops patents for intermediate goods, which are sold to
the new firms that enter intermediate goods production. To put it differently, an entrant into
the intermediate goods sector has to purchase a new intermediate-specific patent from the R&D
sector as a fixed up-front investment to be able to start the production process. These up-front
investments are financed by issuing shares that are bought by the households in the economy,
which, in turn, receive the associated dividend income and may experience valuation gains.5
There exists a continuum of homogeneous households of mass one. The flow budget con-
straint of the representative household has the following form:
K˙ + pZZ˙ = rK +DZ + wL− C, (1)
where K denotes physical capital employed by incumbent firms, r is the rental rate of physical
capital, Z is the number of shares issued by entrants up to time t, pZ denotes the price of these
shares, D refers to the dividend payments per share, L is exogenously given supply of labor,
w is the real wage rate, C refers to consumption, and for any variable x the derivative with
4For the sake of simplicity, we follow the literature on horizontal innovations. Similar effects would, however,
also be present in case of vertical innovations. For R&D-based growth models in general see Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Jones (1995), Kortum (1997), Segerstro¨m (1998),
Peretto (1998), Young (1998), Howitt (1999), Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001), Strulik (2005), Bucci (2008), and
Strulik et al. (2013). For extensive surveys see Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) and Aghion and Howitt (2005).
5See, for example, Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Streeb (2016) for the importance of the stock market for innovative
firms.
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respect to time t is denoted by x˙ ≡ dx/dt.6
Individuals earn labor income and asset income. The former is given by wL, while the latter
consists of capital income rK and dividend payments DZ. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, we ignore the depreciation of physical capital. To summarize, the right-hand side
of the flow budget constraint refers to total saving, while the left-hand side shows that total
saving is either used for investments in physical capital or for purchasing the shares that are
newly issued by entrants into the intermediate goods sector to finance the patents of the new
technologies needed to start production.
In contrast to the standard framework, we employ status preferences to account for the
fact that one’s own felicity also depends on the comparison with others. More specifically, we
assume that instantaneous utility u of the representative consumer depends not only on her
consumption C, but also on her status S, i.e., the utility function has the form u = u (C, S),
where we assume the following:
∂u
∂C
> 0,
∂2u
∂C2
< 0,
∂u
∂S
> 0,
∂2u
∂S2
< 0,
∂2u
∂C2
∂2u
∂S2
−
(
∂2u
∂C∂S
)2
≥ 0, (2)
∂
(
∂u
∂S
/
∂u
∂C
)
∂C
> 0,
∂
(
∂u
∂S
/
∂u
∂C
)
∂S
< 0, (3)
lim
C→0
∂u (C, S)
∂C
=∞, lim
C→∞
∂u (C, S)
∂C
= 0. (4)
Assumption (2) signifies that the representative consumer derives positive but diminishing
marginal utility from both consumption and status. Moreover, the utility function u is jointly
concave in C and S. According to (3), the marginal rate of substitution of status for consump-
tion (∂u/∂S) / (∂u/∂C) depends positively on C and negatively on S. These properties are
normality conditions with respect to status and consumption. Finally, (4) introduces standard
Inada conditions with respect to the marginal utility of consumption.
With respect to status S, two alternative specifications are employed in the literature. In
the relative consumption approach, status S is determined by a comparison of own consumption
with average consumption of a reference group. In models with homogeneous agents, average
consumption of the total household sector serves as the benchmark. In the relative wealth
approach the determination of status rests on a comparison of own wealth with average wealth.
We focus our attention on the latter approach, because, as we already explained, this allows
us to analyze the differential status effects of physical capital versus shares issued by entrants,
which is of crucial importance for long-run growth.
A crucial and distinctive feature of our model is that the components of wealth are allowed
to differ with respect to their effect on social status. More specifically, we assume that
S = S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
,
∂S
∂Ω
> 0,
∂2S
∂Ω2
≤ 0, ∂S
∂Ω¯
< 0, (5)
6Note that the derivative of total wealth K + pZZ with respect to time t is obtained by adding the valuation
gains of shares p˙ZZ on both sides of the flow budget constraint (1) such that K˙ + pZZ˙ + p˙ZZ = rK + DZ +
p˙ZZ + wL− C.
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where
Ω ≡ φKK + φZpZZ and Ω¯ ≡ φKK¯ + φZpZZ¯ (6)
are the status-relevant measures of own wealth and average economy-wide wealth, respectively.
The parameter φZ ≥ 0 is the status weight of shares issued by entrants to purchase new
technologies from the R&D sector. The parameter φK ≥ 0 refers to the status weight of
physical capital employed by incumbent intermediate firms. For simplicity, it is often assumed
in the literature that households own the physical capital. Non-entrepreneurial households rent
it out to firms, while entrepreneurial households might also employ it in their own firms. A
common hypothesis of the psychological status literature is that the observability/visibility of
an item exerts a significant positive effect on its degree of positionality. Hence, if households
literally own physical capital, then the observability/visibility aspect implies that this possession
entails a stronger status effect than the ownership of shares. Think in this context of owning
the Empire State Building or other commercial properties and renting out their office space
to firms. This interpretation would give rise to the parameter specification φK > φZ . The
alternative assumption is that physical capital is in the possession of firms. Households supply
the funds that are required for its purchase either directly (via financial markets) or indirectly
(via banks). In case that firms finance investment through bank loans or corporate bonds,
implying that rK has to be interpreted as interest income, it is plausible that the ownership
of shares exerts a higher status effect than financial claims held in the form of loans or bonds.
A rationale for the superiority of shares is that savings accounts or corporate bonds are often
considered as conservative, uninspiring, or even dull forms of wealth. This interpretation would
imply the parameter specification φK < φZ . Even if incumbent firms finance the purchase of
physical capital through equity, these shares need not be as status relevant as those issued by
startups. One may, in this context, think of innovation-friendly societies in which the segment of
shares that is associated with technological progress is more status relevant or more fashionable
than other shares so that φK < φZ . In such societies it could even be a social norm to act in
a way that fosters progress (a suitable example might be the US). However, the opposite could
be true in conservative societies in which people are afraid of the potential negative effects
and dangers of innovation (examples for this might include some European countries) and as
a result prefer claims against incumbent firms implying that φK > φZ . The standard relative
wealth approach in which all assets are treated as equally status relevant is obtained by setting
φK = φZ = 1 so that Ω is identical to the standard definition of wealth as given by K + pZZ.
This specification would, for instance, fit to situations in which households are able to assess the
total magnitude of wealth held by other households, but don’t have any detailed information
about the compositions of their portfolios.
In our comprehensive theoretical analysis we allow for all of the relative status cases men-
tioned above. It will become clear that the long-run economic growth rate depends crucially
upon the relative status relevance of shares issued by entrants. Our generalization therefore
yields additional insights that cannot be obtained in the standard relative wealth approach in
which all assets are of equal importance with respect to status or in an AK growth model in
which only one asset exists.
In (5) we assume that status S = S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
increases in own wealth Ω, with marginal status
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being non-increasing, and decreases in average wealth Ω¯. The latter implies negative wealth
externalities. In the status literature it is common practice to restrict attention to symmetric
equilibria in which identical agents make identical choices such that Ω = Ω¯ holds along an
equilibrium path. With respect to symmetric situations, we follow Fisher and Hof (2005) and
assume that the following condition holds:
S (Ω,Ω) = χ = constant, for Ω > 0. (7)
Assumption (7) ensures that our approach corresponds to a pure relative wealth specification
because the flow of utility is independent of the level of wealth Ω along any symmetric equilib-
rium path, i.e., u [C, S (Ω,Ω)] = u (C,χ).7 It is easily verified that two standard specifications
of the status literature, the difference specification
S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
= ϕ
(
Ω− Ω¯) , ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ ≤ 0 (8)
and the ratio specification
S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
= ϕ
(
Ω/Ω¯
)
, ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ ≤ 0 (9)
satisfy Assumption (5) and Assumption (7).
By optimally choosing the time paths of C, K˙, and Z˙, the representative household maxi-
mizes overall utility as given by ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu
[
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)]
dt,
where ρ > 0 denotes the time-preference rate, subject to the flow budget constraint (1), the
definitions of Ω and Ω¯ as given by (6), and the initial conditions K (0) = K0 and Z (0) = Z0. A
crucial feature of this optimization problem is that the representative household takes the time
paths of w, r, pZ , D, and Ω¯ as given. This is due to the fact that in a continuum of households
each single household has mass zero and its choices do not affect aggregate variables.
A detailed analysis of this optimization problem is provided in Appendix A. Here we
only mention the three aspects with respect to which the symmetric equilibrium of the status-
augmented model differs from the equilibrium of the standard Romer (1990) model.
The first modification is that the no-arbitrage condition between saving in terms of physical
capital and saving in terms of shares that holds in the standard Romer (1990) model
r =
D
pZ
+
p˙Z
pZ
(10)
has to be replaced by
r + εK (C,Ω, χ, φK) =
D
pZ
+
p˙Z
pZ
+ εZ (C,Ω, χ, φZ) (11)
7Note that absolute wealth Ω would play a role along symmetric equilibrium paths if the instantaneous utility
function u (C, S) was replaced by u (C,Ω, S).
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where
εK (C,Ω, χ, φK) ≡MRS (C,Ω, χ)× φK , (12)
εZ (C,Ω, χ, φZ) ≡MRS (C,Ω, χ)× φZ , (13)
MRS (C,Ω, χ) ≡ ∂u (C,χ)
∂S
∂S (Ω,Ω)
∂Ω
[
∂u (C,χ)
∂C
]−1
. (14)
On the left-hand side of (11), r + εK is the effective rate of return of wealth accumulation
in the form of physical capital, where r is the market rental rate of physical capital, while
εK (C,Ω, χ, φK) as defined in (12) is the status-related extra return of physical capital. On the
right-hand side of (11), (D + p˙Z) /pZ + ε
Z is the effective rate of return of wealth accumulation
in the form of shares, where the market return (D + p˙Z) /pZ results from dividend payments
and valuation gains, while εZ (C,Ω, χ, φZ) as defined in (13) is the status-related extra return
of shares. The term MRS (C,Ω, χ) defined in (14) is the marginal rate of substitution of
status-relevant own wealth Ω for consumption C as perceived by the representative agent in a
symmetric state in which Ω = Ω¯ holds. Taking into account that φK is the weight of physical
capital in the status-relevant measure of wealth, Ω = φKK + φZpZZ, it follows that ε
K =
MRS × φK is the symmetric MRS of own physical capital K for consumption C. Analogously,
εZ = MRS × φZ is the symmetric MRS of own shares Z for consumption C. The economic
interpretation of εK given above can also be verified as follows: From the perspective of the
representative household, an increase in own physical capital K by a marginal unit causes the
status-relevant measure of wealth Ω to increase by φK units. Since i) the household takes
average wealth as given, and ii) Ω = Ω¯ holds at the outset of our thought experiment, this
increase in Ω by φK units causes status S to rise by [∂S (Ω,Ω) /∂Ω]φK units and felicity u
to increase by [∂u (C,χ) /∂S] [∂S (Ω,Ω) /∂Ω]φK units. Dividing the latter expression by the
marginal utility of own consumption, ∂u (C,χ) /∂C, we obtain the amount of consumption C
that the status-conscious household is willing to give up in exchange for an increase in K by a
marginal unit. Analogous considerations can be used for the interpretation of εZ .
It can be shown that the partial derivatives of MRS (C,Ω, χ) exhibit the following prop-
erties: i) The normality assumption with respect to status given by the first inequality in (3)
implies that ∂MRS/∂C > 0; ii) under the ratio specification of the status function (9) we obtain
∂MRS/∂Ω < 0. The difference specification (8) implies that ∂MRS/∂Ω = 0 holds. Already at
this point it is obvious that this property of the difference specification rules out the existence of
a balanced growth path, because permanent growth would lead to ever-increasing status-related
extra returns of physical capital and shares, εK and εZ .
The second modification as compared to Romer (1990) refers to the Euler equation for
consumption. In the standard framework, where u = u (C), it holds that
C˙
C
= σ (C) (r − ρ) , with σ (C) ≡ − u
′ (C)
Cu′′ (C)
.
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In our case this has to be replaced by
C˙
C
= σS (C,χ)
[
r + εK (C,Ω, χ, φK)− ρ
]
, (15)
where, according to Assumption (7), χ = constant = S (Ω,Ω), for Ω > 0. The term σS (C,χ)
in which the superscript “S” refers to “status” is the effective elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution under relative wealth preferences in a symmetric equilibrium as given by
σS (C,χ) ≡ −∂u (C,χ)
∂C
[
C
∂2u (C,χ)
∂C2
]−1
. (16)
For a given value of the rental rate of capital r, the modified Euler equation implies the follow-
ing: the higher the status-related component of the effective rate of return, εK , the higher is
the growth rate of consumption C˙/C. In other words, the willingness to substitute future con-
sumption for present consumption increases, implying that individuals save more. In a general
macroeconomic equilibrium as analyzed below, r is determined endogenously. It is therefore
possible that the positive impact of εK > 0 on the effective rate of return r+ εK is partially or
even completely offset by a fall in the market rate of return r.
The third modification concerns the transversality conditions. In the standard model they
are given by
lim
t→∞
{
exp
[
−
∫ t
0
r(v)dv
]
K
}
= 0, lim
t→∞
{
exp
[
−
∫ t
0
[r(v)] dv
]
pZZ
}
= 0, (17)
such that the present values of wealth held in the form of physical capital and shares must
converge to zero as time goes to infinity. In the model with relative wealth preferences, the
market rate of return r is replaced by the effective rate of return r + εK such that
limt→∞
{
exp
[
− ∫ t0 [r(v) + εK(v)] dv]K} = 0,
limt→∞
{
exp
[
− ∫ t0 [r(v) + εK(v)] dv] pZZ} = 0,
(18)
where εK(v) = εK [C(v),Ω(v), χ, φK ].
2.2 Production side
The production side of the economy follows the standard R&D-based growth literature so that
our description will be short and focused on the main parts that we need in the subsequent
analysis.
The final goods sector consists of a continuum of perfectly competitive firms of mass one,
each of which produces the same single good by employing the same technology. The production
function of the representative firm is given by
Y = L1−αY
∫ A
0
xαi di, (19)
9
where Y is output, LY denotes labor input, and xi is the amount of the intermediate good of
type i ∈ [0, A] used in final goods production. In this context, A refers to the technological
frontier, i.e., the spectrum of patents for specific varieties i that has already been discovered by
R&D in the past. For simplicity, the elasticities of output with respect to the various types of
intermediate goods are identical and given by α ∈ (0, 1). Since, by assumption, the mass of firms
equals one, output and labor input of the representative firm coincide with GDP and aggregate
employment in the final goods sector, respectively. The perfectly competitive representative
firm takes both the real wage wY in the final goods sector and the real prices of intermediate
goods pi as given and maximizes profits by choosing the inputs LY and xi. The corresponding
first-order conditions (FOCs) are
wY = (1− α)L−αY
∫ A
0
xαi di = (1− α)
∫ A
0
(
xi
LY
)α
di, (20)
pi = αL
1−α
Y x
−(1−α)
i = α
(
xi
LY
)−(1−α)
. (21)
These conditions require that each input is utilized up to the point at which its marginal product
equals its real price (i.e., its price in terms of the final good). From (20) and (21) it follows that
– in a general equilibrium – the remuneration of workers equals (1− α) percent of real revenue
Y , while α percent are used to pay for the intermediate goods.
Entrants into the intermediate goods sector have to purchase the patent of a new technology
from the R&D sector as up-front investment before they can produce the corresponding patent-
specific differentiated intermediate good. The incumbent firms i ∈ [0, A] in the intermediate
goods sector employ a single variable production factor, physical capital, which it either rents
from private households or finances through bonds or loans. The production function is assumed
to be linear and, without loss of generality, the productivity of physical capital is normalized to
one such that xi = ki. Taking into account this linear production function and the first-order
condition for the optimal input of xi in the final goods sector [see (21)], operating profits of
intermediate goods producers can be written as
pii = pixi − rxi = αL1−αY xαi − rxi.
Profit-maximization implies that prices are set according to the rule
pi =
1
α
r, (22)
where the rental rate r represents marginal cost and (1/α) > 1 is the gross markup we are
familiar with from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Hence, firms have a certain degree of price setting
power and operating profits will be positive. This price setting policy implies that production
xi and input of physical capital ki in the intermediate goods sector depend negatively on the
rental rate r and positively (in a linear way) on employment in the final goods sector LY :
xi = ki =
(
α2
r
)1/(1−α)
LY . (23)
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The same is true for operating profits:
pii = (1− α)α(1+α)/(1−α)r−α/(1−α)LY . (24)
Since all incumbent firms i ∈ [0, A] make identical choices, we can drop the index i in the
subsequent analysis and use the notation p, x, k, and pi instead.
The R&D sector employs scientists LA to discover new technologies in the form of blueprints
A according to the production function
A˙ = λALA, (25)
where λ refers to the productivity of scientists. There is perfect competition in the research
sector such that R&D firms take both the real price of blueprints pA and the real wage of
scientists wA as given. Since the production function (25) is linear in LA, the profit of the
representative R&D firm (pAλA− wA)LA is linear in LA, too. Hence, the existence of profit-
maximizing production plans with LA > 0 requires that scientists are paid their marginal
product, i.e.,
pAλA = wA. (26)
2.3 Market clearing and equilibrium dynamics
We close the model by introducing the market clearing conditions for all markets. Afterwards
we derive a system of differential equations that governs the dynamic evolution of the economy
in a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium. In such an equilibrium households maximize utility,
firms maximize profits, and all market clearing conditions are satisfied. The word “symmetric”
means that households – being identical in every respect – and firms – facing identical cost and
demand functions – make identical choices.
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that the wage rates earned in the final goods sector
and in the R&D sector are equal because labor is homogenous. In addition, the sum of labor
inputs in these two sectors must equal the exogenously given labor supply of households:
wY = wA = w and LY + LA = L. (27)
Equilibrium in the rental market for physical capital requires that the supply of capital (K) is
equal to the aggregate capital input of firms in the intermediate goods sector (Ak). Using (23),
this condition can be written as
K = Ak = A
(
α2
r
)1/(1−α)
LY . (28)
Equilibrium in the stock market requires that all previously and newly issued shares are held by
households. The normalization of the number of shares that are issued by a single intermediate
firm to 1 yields Z = A and Z˙ = A˙. Since all firms in the intermediate goods sector earn identical
profits, their shares will have the same price in equilibrium. From the no-arbitrage condition
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under status preferences (11) it follows that the common price of shares at time t is given by
pZ (t) =
∫ ∞
t
exp
{
−
∫ τ
t
[r (v) + Γ (v)] dv
}
D (τ) dτ,
where
Γ ≡ εK (C,Ω, χ, φK)− εZ (C,Ω, χ, φZ) = MRS (C,Ω, χ) (φK − φZ) . (29)
Future dividend payments are discounted by r + Γ ≡ r + εK − εZ , i.e., the sum of the market
rental rate r and the difference between the status-related extra returns of wealth accumulation
in the form of physical capital and shares, εK−εZ . If φK = φZ , the extra returns εK and εZ are
equal, such that the formula for the calculation of the fundamental value of a stock simplifies
to the standard expression in Romer (1990).
New entrants into the intermediate goods sector have to buy a new technology in the form
of a patent at price pA the purchase of which is financed by issuing a new share. Due to free
entry, competition between new entrants will cause pA to reach the highest possible level. Since
the price of a share attains its maximum if the operating profit is fully distributed in the form
of dividends, we have that D = pi holds in equilibrium and the share price is given by
pA (t) = pZ (t) =
∫ ∞
t
exp
{
−
∫ τ
t
[r (v) + Γ (v)] dv
}
pi (τ) dτ, (30)
where Γ is defined by (29). Differentiating (30) with respect to time t, we obtain the following
differential equation for the evolution of the price of patents:
p˙A
pA
= r +MRS (C,Ω, χ) (φK − φZ)− pi
pA
. (31)
Substituting various results derived above into the flow budget constraint of the represen-
tative household (1), we show in the Supplement that the market for final goods is also in
equilibrium, i.e.,
Y = C + K˙, (32)
such that output of final goods is either consumed or used for investment in physical capital.
Putting all the information together, we show in the Supplement that the dynamic evolution
of the four variables A, K, LA, and C is governed by the following system of differential
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equations:
A˙
A
= λLA, (33)
K˙
K
=
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
− C
K
, (34)
C˙
C
= σS (C,χ)
{
α2
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
+ εK (C,Ω, χ, φK)− ρ
}
, (35)
L˙A = (L− LA)
{
− (1− α)
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
+
C
K
+ λLA
−λ (L− LA) + ε
K (C,Ω, χ, φK)− εZ (C,Ω, χ, φK)
α
}
, (36)
where
Ω = φKK + φZ
(1− α)A
λ
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
(37)
holds in (35) and (36). Inspection of the system (33)–(37) reveals that, as in the standard
framework of Romer (1990), we need to impose additional structure on the preferences to
ensure the existence of a balanced growth path (BGP). The BGP is defined as a stationary
equilibrium in which the variables A, K, C, and Ω grow at the same constant rate
g∗ =
(
A˙/A
)∗
=
(
K˙/K
)∗
=
(
C˙/C
)∗
=
(
Ω˙/Ω
)∗
> 0,
while the variables LA, K/ [A (L− LA)], C/K, and
C
Ω
=
C
K
φK + φZ
1− α
λ (L− LA)
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α) (38)
remain unchanged at their steady-state levels L∗A, {K/ [A (L− LA)]}∗, (C/K)∗, and (C/Ω)∗.
A crucial element of the derivation of the differential equations (34)–(36) is the fact that the
variables r, p, pi, w/A, pA, and Y/K can be expressed as functions of K/ [A (L− LA)] and
(L− LA). Hence, along the BGP we are looking for, these variables are constant, while aggregate
output, per capita output, and wages grow at rate g∗.
In the rest of the paper we restrict our attention to specifications of the instantaneous utility
function u (C, S) and the status function S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
such that i) the symmetric effective elasticity
of intertemporal substitution under relative wealth preferences does not depend on C, i.e.,
∂σS (C,χ)
∂C
= 0, (39)
and ii) the symmetric marginal rate of substitution of status-relevant own wealth Ω for con-
sumption C, MRS (C,Ω, χ), can be expressed as a function of C/Ω. Since we are also interested
in analytical solutions, we employ the stronger assumption that MRS (C,Ω, χ) depends linearly
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on C/Ω such that
MRS = η × C
Ω
η > 0, (40)
where η represents the intensity of the quest for status of the representative consumer. The
sign of η follows from the already mentioned fact that ∂MRS/∂C > 0 holds because of the
normality of status. Equation (40) implies that the status-related extra returns εK and εZ are
linear functions of C/Ω:
εK = φKη × C
Ω
, εZ = φZη × C
Ω
. (41)
The structure that we impose by (39) and (40) on u (C, S) and S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
is rather mild. In
the Supplement we show that the quite general specification of relative wealth preferences given
by
u (C, S) = V [g (C)h (S)] , S = S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
,
satisfies the properties (39) and (40) if i) the instantaneous utility function has the form
u (C, S) =
1
1− θ
{[
Cξh (S)
]1−θ − 1} , ξ > 0, θ > 0, 1 + ξ (θ − 1) > 0 (42)
where h (S) > 0 and h′ (S) > 0, and ii) the status function exhibits the ratio specification
S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
= ϕ
(
Ω/Ω¯
)
, ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ ≤ 0. (43)
These specifications of u (C, S) and S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
imply that χ = S (Ω,Ω) = ϕ (1) and
σS =
1
1 + ξ (θ − 1) > 0, (44)
MRS = η × C
Ω
, η ≡ β
ξ
> 0, β ≡ h
′ [ϕ (1)]ϕ′ (1)
h [ϕ (1)]
=
h′ (χ)ϕ′ (1)
h (χ)
> 0. (45)
For ξ = 1 these results simplify to σS = 1/θ and η = β.
Substituting (41) into (35) and (36) yields
C˙
C
= σS
{
α2
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
+ φKη
C
Ω
− ρ
}
, (46)
L˙A = (L− LA)
{
− (1− α)
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
+
C
K
+ λLA − λ (L− LA) + (φK − φZ) η
α
C
Ω
}
,
(47)
where C/Ω is given by (38).
In the following we analyze the system that consists of the differential equations (33), (34),
(46), and (47). To determine the BGP, we replace A˙/A, K˙/K, and C˙/C by the common growth
rate g and set L˙A = 0. From the differential equation (33) and the labor market equilibrium
condition (27), it follows that
L∗A =
g∗
λ
, L∗Y = L− L∗A =
λL− g∗
λ
. (48)
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The production function for new blueprints and the labor market equilibrium condition imply
that any rise in the common growth rate g∗ requires a reallocation of labor from the final goods
sector to the R&D sector, i.e., an increase in L∗A and a corresponding decrease in L
∗
Y .
The differential equation (34), which results from the equilibrium condition of the market
for final goods, implies that(
Y
K
)∗
=
[(
A
K
)∗
(L− L∗A)
]1−α
= g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗
. (49)
Substituting (48) and (49) into the differential equations (46) and (47) and taking into account
Equation (38), we derive a two-dimensional system of equations in the two variables g∗ and
(C/K)∗ (see Appendix B):
− (1− α2σS) g∗ + σS
α2 +
φKη
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗
[
g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗]

(
C
K
)∗
= σSρ, (50)
(1 + α) g∗ +
1
α
α2 +
(φK − φZ) η
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗
[
g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗]

(
C
K
)∗
= λL. (51)
Equation (50) is a representation of the steady-state version of the Euler equation for consump-
tion,
g∗ = σS
[
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗ − ρ] , (52)
which is obtained by expressing the rental rate r∗ and the status-related extra return of wealth
accumulation in the form of real capital (εK)∗ as functions of g∗ and (C/K)∗ and taking into
account that (C˙/C)∗ = g∗. From a technical point of view, Equation (51) yields combinations
of g∗ and (C/K)∗ that exhibit the property that L˙A = 0. For the economic interpretations it
will be of crucial importance that Equation (51) is equivalent to the steady-state version of the
no-arbitrage condition
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
= (pi/pA)
∗ +
(
εZ
)∗
, (53)
which is obtained by expressing r∗, (εK)∗, the dividend yield (pi/pA)∗, and the status-related
extra return of wealth accumulation in the form of shares (εZ)∗ as functions of g∗ and (C/K)∗
and taking into account that (p˙A/pA)
∗ = 0.8
In the Supplement we analyze the existence, uniqueness, and stability properties of the
BGP. If an economically meaningful equilibrium exists, it is unique. The saddle-point stability
is proved analytically for the special cases in which i) shares and capital are equally status
relevant or ii) shares are irrelevant for status. For the general case, we illustrate the saddle
point stability numerically.
8The equivalence of (51) and (53) is not obvious at first glance. In the Supplement we show that i) the differen-
tial equation for pA given by (31) is the starting point for the derivation of the differential equation for LA given
by (47) and ii) Equation (47) is equivalent to L˙A = (L− LA)
{
1/α
[
r + εK − (pi/pA + εZ)]− K˙/K + A˙/A} .
Setting L˙A = 0 and taking into account that (K˙/K)
∗ = (A˙/A)∗ = g∗, we obtain (53).
15
3 The long-run economic effects of the quest for status
In the following we analyze the dependence of the BGP on the status parameter η. This
parameter is an important determinant of the status-related extra returns εK = φKη × (C/Ω)
and εZ = φZη × (C/Ω). More precisely, we consider modifications in the specification of
status preferences that cause variations in η, but leave the effective elasticity of intertemporal
substitution σS unchanged. In the context of the general CIES preferences (42) and (43) and
the resulting expressions for σS and η as given by (44) and (45), respectively, this implies that
we consider variations in β, while leaving ξ unchanged. This thought experiment should be
interpreted as the comparison between the balanced growth paths of two economies that differ
only with respect to the status parameter η (high-η-economy or more status conscious economy
versus low-η-economy or less status conscious economy).
Before we start with the analysis, we want to stress a crucial feature of our framework that
is important for the interpretation of our results but which is absent in the standard Romer
(1990) model. From the steady-state versions of the Euler equation for consumption, g∗ =
σS
[
r∗ + (εK)∗ − ρ], and the no-arbitrage relation, r∗ + (εK)∗ = (pi/pA)∗ + (εZ)∗, it is obvious
that a rise in the steady-state growth rate g∗ requires an increase in both the effective rate of
return on physical capital, r∗+(εK)∗, and the effective rate of return on shares, (pi/pA)∗+(εZ)∗.
The most important aspect of the model with status preferences is that the market rates of
return r∗ and (pi/pA)∗ and the effective rates of return r∗ + (εK)∗ and (pi/pA)∗ + (εZ)∗ may
move in opposite directions in response to variations in the status parameter η. The production
function of the R&D sector, A˙ = λALA, implies that g
∗ = λL∗A. Hence, a higher growth rate
requires more scientists in the R&D sector. In any (stationary and non-stationary) equilibrium,
the following positive relation between the dividend yield and employment in the final goods
sector holds (for a proof see the Supplement):
pi/pA = αλLY = αλ (L− LA) . (54)
It follows that (pi/pA)
∗ = α (λL− g∗), i.e., for given values of α, λ, and L, there is an inverse
relation between the steady-state value of the dividend yield (pi/pA)
∗ and the steady-state value
of the common growth rate g∗. This result, together with the Euler equation for consumption
and the no-arbitrage relation, implies the following: A stronger quest for status (higher η) can
only be associated with a higher common growth rate g∗ if there is an increase in the status-
related extra return of shares (εZ)∗ that is only partially compensated by a decrease in the
dividend yield (pi/pA)
∗. In this case both effective rates of return (on physical capital and on
shares) are higher and so is the growth rate.
First, we analyze the special case φK = φZ = 1 in which the status-relevant measure of
wealth Ω equals the standard definition of wealth. In this case physical capital and shares
are equally relevant for status such that status-related extra returns coincide at any time t.
From the steady-state version of the no-arbitrage equation (53) it then follows that, along the
BGP, the market rates of return on physical capital and shares are equal, i.e., r∗ = (pi/pA)∗.
Altogether, we are able to state the following proposition for this case.
Proposition 1. If φZ = φK = 1, the BGP exhibits the following properties:
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i) The solutions for g∗ and (C/K)∗ are given by
g∗ =
σS [(α+ η)λL− ρ]
1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]
,
(
C
K
)∗
=
λL− (1 + α) g∗
α
=
(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ
α {1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]} .
The solution for (C/K)∗ is economically sensible if(
C
K
)∗
> 0⇔ g∗ < λL
1 + α
⇔ (1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ > 0. (55)
The steady-state growth rate g∗ is strictly positive if and only if the representative house-
hold is sufficiently patient in the sense that
ρ < (α+ η)λL. (56)
ii) If (55) holds, then g∗ depends positively on the status parameter η
∂g∗
∂η
=
ασS
1 + [α+ η (1 + α)]σS
(
C
K
)∗
> 0,
while the other endogenous variables exhibit the following dependence on η:
∂v∗
∂η
< 0 for v =
C
K
,
C
Y
,
C
Ω
, LY ,
Y
K
, r, p,
pi
pA
,
∂v∗
∂η
> 0 for v = LA,
x
LY
, x, εK , εZ , r + εK ,
pi
pA
+ εZ , pA,
w
A
,
sgn
(
∂pi∗
∂η
)
= sgn (2α− 1) .
iii) The composition of wealth does not depend on the status parameter η:(
K
K + pAA
)∗
= α,
(
pAA
K + pAA
)∗
= 1− α.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
In the following we provide the economic interpretation of the results described in this
proposition. If φZ = φK = 1, any economically sensible BGP exhibits the property that the
common growth rate g∗ (of consumption, physical capital, the number of shares, the mass of
intermediate goods, output of final goods, the representative household’s wealth, and of real
wages) depends positively on the status parameter η. A crucial feature of the case φZ = φK = 1
is that the identical effective rates of return r∗+(εK)∗ and (pi/pA)∗+(εZ)∗ also depend positively
on the status parameter η. As mentioned above, this results from the fact that a rise in η leads
to an increase in the identical status-related components (εK)∗ and (εZ)∗ that is only partially
offset by the fall in the identical market rates of return, r∗ and (pi/pA)∗. According to the Euler
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equation for consumption, the rise in the effective rate of return r∗+(εK)∗ implies an increase in
the growth rate of private consumption (C˙/C)∗ = g∗. In other words, the greater η, the steeper
the consumption path chosen by the representative household, i.e., the higher the willingness
to substitute future consumption for current consumption. The resulting changes in the saving
behavior imply that the growth rate of the representative household’s wealth increases. In
contrast to its growth rate, the composition of wealth does not depend on η because α percent
is held in the form of physical capital, while 1− α percent is held in the form of shares.
Since physical capital holdings grow at a higher rate, the capital input in the intermediate
goods sector also has to grow at a higher rate. In the high-η-economy, firms in the intermediate
goods sector face a lower rental rate of physical capital r∗, i.e., a lower marginal cost, and
hence they will charge a lower price for their products as determined by p∗ = (1/α)× r∗. The
lower price of intermediate goods p∗ induces the representative firm of the final goods sector to
produce with a higher intensity of intermediate goods. This increase in (x/LY )
∗ originates from
both an increase in the common input of each existing variety of intermediate goods x∗ and a
fall in labor input L∗Y . The latter effect allows for the sectoral reallocation of labor from final
goods production to R&D that is necessary to achieve a faster rate of technological progress.
As explained above, the number of shares that are held by individuals and issued by the
firms to finance the purchase of new technologies grows faster in the high-η-economy. The price
of shares and therefore also the price of new technologies depends positively on η, while there
is no growth in the price of new technologies along the BGP. The reason for the level effect is
the following. Since the status-related extra returns of both savings vehicles are equal in case
of φK = φZ = 1, the dividends financed by operating profits are discounted with the rental
rate of physical capital, r∗. The rise in η implies a fall of the rental rate of physical capital,
which guarantees a rise in the net present value of profits and therefore of the price of shares
and patents, irrespective of the fact that the dependence of operating profits pi∗ upon η is
ambiguous.9 New entrants in the intermediate goods sector have to pay a higher price for the
patents in the high-η-economy. However, since the effective rate of return on shares is higher in
the high-η-economy, its inhabitants are more willing to acquire the associated shares, in spite
of the lower dividend yield.
Now we show why the R&D sector has to charge a higher price for the blueprints in the
high-η economy. The rise in the intermediate goods intensity in the final goods sector implies
an increase in the marginal product of labor and, hence, a rise in the ratio of the real wage to
the mass of varieties (w/A)∗. Since the technology of the R&D sector is linear and we have
perfect competition, the equilibrium has to be characterized by p∗A = λ
−1 (w/A)∗ and profits in
the R&D sector are zero. In the high-η-economy, each value of A is associated with a higher
real wage. Moreover, the real wage also grows faster.
Finally, we show why the results of the proposition are consistent with the market clearing
condition of the final goods sector, Y = C + K˙, and the implied relation g∗ = (K˙/K)∗ =
(Y/K)∗ − (C/K)∗ = [1− (C/Y )∗] (Y/K)∗. An increase in η raises the growth rate of physical
capital because the reduction of (Y/K)∗ is smaller then the reduction of (C/K)∗. In other
words, the rise in the economy-wide savings rate [1− (C/Y )∗] is only partially compensated
9Recall that an increase in η reduces p∗ and raises x∗. Altogether we have: sgn(∂pi∗/∂η) =sgn(2α− 1).
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by the fall in (Y/K)∗. The reason for the fall of (Y/K)∗ is in turn given by the increase in
the intermediate goods intensity of the final goods sector and the associated fall in the average
product of the aggregate input of intermediate goods [Y/ (Ax)]∗ = (Y/K)∗.
Next we turn our attention to the special case φK = 1 and φZ = 0 in which wealth held in
the form of shares is irrelevant for status, εZ = 0. The steady-state version of the no-arbitrage
equation simplifies to r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
= (pi/pA)
∗. Hence, along the BGP, the rental rate of physical
capital is less than the dividend yield, i.e., r∗ < (pi/pA)∗. Moreover, to calculate the fundamental
price of shares, future dividend payments are discounted by using the effective rate of return on
physical capital, r∗ + (εK)∗. Altogether, we are able to state the following proposition for this
case.
Proposition 2. If φZ = 0 and φK = 1, the BGP exhibits the following properties:
i) The solutions for g∗ and (C/K)∗ are given by
g∗ =
σS (αλL− ρ)
1 + ασS
,(
C
K
)∗
=
α [λL− (1 + α) g∗]
α2 + η
=
α
[(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ]
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)
.
The solution for (C/K)∗ is economically sensible if(
C
K
)∗
> 0⇔ g∗ < λL
1 + α
⇔ (1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ > 0. (57)
The steady-state growth rate g∗ is strictly positive if and only if the representative house-
hold is sufficiently patient in the sense that
ρ < αλL. (58)
ii) The growth rate g∗ is independent of the status parameter η,
∂g∗
∂η
= 0
and this independence is also true for the following variables:
∂v∗
∂η
= 0 for v = LA, LY , r + ε
K ,
pi
pA
, εZ .
The other endogenous variables exhibit the following dependence on η:
∂v∗
∂η
< 0 for v =
C
K
,
C
Ω
,
C
Y
,
Y
K
, r, p,
∂v∗
∂η
> 0 for v =
x
LY
, x, pi, εK , pA,
w
A
.
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iii) The composition of wealth exhibits the following properties:
∂ [K/ (K + pAA)]
∗
∂η
> 0,
(
K
K + pAA
)∗∣∣∣∣
η=0
= α, lim
η→∞
(
K
K + pAA
)∗
< 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
The striking feature of the case φZ = 0 and φK = 1 is that the growth rate g
∗ is independent
of the status parameter η. The technology used in the research sector and labor market clearing
imply that employment in the R&D sector and in the final goods sector, L∗A and L
∗
Y , respectively,
are also independent of η. This result does not come as a surprise. In interpreting Equation
(54), pi/pA = αλLY = αλ (L− LA), we already stressed that a stronger quest for status (higher
η) can only be associated with a higher common growth rate g∗ if there is an increase in the
status-related extra return of shares (εZ)∗ that is only partially compensated by a decrease in
the dividend yield (pi/pA)
∗. However, if φZ = 0, then εZ = 0, so that the required increase in
(εZ)∗ cannot occur.
A rise in η leads to an increase in the status-related component of saving in the form
of physical capital (εK)∗ that is perfectly offset by the fall in the rental rate r∗ so that the
effective rate of return on physical capital remains unchanged. From the Euler equation for
consumption it follows that the growth rate of private consumption (C˙/C)∗ = g∗ remains
unchanged, too. In other words, along the BGP, the willingness to substitute future consumption
for current consumption is independent of the status parameter η. The no-arbitrage equation
r∗ + (εK)∗ = (pi/pA)∗ implies that the dividend yield (pi/pA)∗ is also independent of η. Note
that a rise in η leaves the growth rate of wealth unchanged, but alters the composition of wealth
in favor of physical capital.
In the high-η-economy, firms in the intermediate goods sector are confronted with a lower
rental rate of physical capital (similar to the case φK = φZ = 1). The resulting lower price
of intermediate goods induces the representative firm of the final goods sector to choose a
higher intermediate goods intensity. This increase of (x/LY )
∗ originates in an increase of x∗,
i.e., the input of each existing variety increases. In contrast to the case of φK = φZ = 1,
employment in final goods production remains unchanged. For the aggregate physical capital
input K = Ak∗ = Ax∗ we have that each value of A is associated with a higher value of
K in the high-η-economy but that the growth rate of physical capital is the same as in the
low-η-economy.
In contrast to the case φK = φZ = 1, operating profits of an intermediate goods producing
firm, pi∗ = (1− α) p∗x∗, depend positively on η because the percentage change of x∗ overcom-
pensates the percentage change of p∗. For the fundamental price of shares we also have an
unambiguous result: The assumptions φK = 1 and φZ = 0 imply that the stream of divi-
dend payments is not discounted with the rental rate r∗ but with the effective rate of return
r∗ + (εK)∗. Since ∂[r∗ + (εK)∗]/∂η = 0, the higher dividends are discounted at the same rate
such that the fundamental value of shares increases. New entrants into the intermediate goods
sector are therefore able to pay for the patents by issuing more expensive shares. In contrast
to the case of φZ = φK = 1, the number of shares that are held by the individuals grows with
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the same rate in the high-η-economy and in the low-η economy.
Again we have argued that the price for patents that new entrants in the intermediate goods
sector pay depends positively on η. Analogous to the previous case, firms in the R&D sector in
the high-η-economy have to charge higher prices because they are confronted with higher real
wages. Regarding the growth rate of real wages, g∗, there is, however, no difference between the
high-η-economy and the low-η-economy. Analogous to the case φK = φZ = 1 we have that the
ratio of the real wage to the mass of varieties (w/A)∗ increases because the intermediate goods
intensity in the final goods sector (x/LY )
∗ rises and the corresponding increase in the marginal
product of labor implies a higher economy-wide wage.
From the market clearing condition of the final goods market, Y = C+K˙, and the associated
condition g∗ = (K˙/K)∗ = (Y/K)∗ − (C/K)∗ = [1− (C/Y )∗] (Y/K)∗ , we get the following
additional information: An increase of η does not affect the growth rate of physical capital
because (Y/K)∗ and (C/K)∗ fall by the same amount. In other words, the increase in the
economy-wide savings rate [1− (C/Y )∗] is fully compensated by a fall of (Y/K)∗. The reduction
of (Y/K)∗ can be derived in analogy to the case φK = φZ = 1 because of the rise of the
intermediate goods intensity in the final goods sector.
Next, we dwell more on the importance of φZ . In this context, we allow for both 0 < φZ ≤
φK and φZ > φK , i.e., shares of entrants might be less or more status relevant than physical
capital employed by incumbents (or the assets that were used to finance its purchase).
The effects of ceteris paribus changes in η are summarized in Proposition 4, which is stated
and proven in the Supplement because most of the results given in Proposition 1 for the special
case φZ = φK carry over to situations in which either 0 < φZ < φK or φZ > φK holds. In
particular, the growth rate g∗, the average propensity to save 1 − (C/Y )∗, and the effective
rates of return r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
and (pi/pA)
∗ +
(
εZ
)∗
depend positively on the status parameter η
regardless of whether shares are less or more status relevant than physical capital. However,
the results for (Y/K)∗ and the variables that depend crucially upon (Y/K)∗ cease to be valid if
the relative status relevance of shares φZ/φK exceeds a critical value that is greater than unity.
Finally, we show that a rise in η alters the composition of wealth in favor of shares if φZ > φK
and in favor of physical capital if φK > φZ , while K/ (K + pAA) = α holds for φZ = φK . Since
these modifications do not affect the main result with respect to economic growth we do not
discuss the details here. Instead, we proceed with the effects of ceteris paribus changes in the
relative status importance of shares.
Proposition 3. If φK > 0 and φZ ≥ 0, then the growth rate g∗ depends positively on the
relative status weight of shares, i.e.,
∂g∗
∂φZ
> 0.
Moreover, the following endogenous variables exhibit an unambiguous dependence on φZ :
∂v∗
∂φZ
> 0 for v =
C
K
,
Y
K
, p, r, LA, r + ε
K ,
pi
pA
+ εZ , εZ ,
∂v∗
∂φZ
< 0 for v =
x
LY
, LY , x, pi,
w
A
, pA,
pi
pA
,
K
K + pAA
.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
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We now turn to the economic interpretation of the results summarized in Proposition 3. A
ceteris paribus rise in φZ implies that private households re-adjust their portfolio by shifting
wealth from physical capital holdings toward shares. The market rate of return on physical
capital, r∗, rises, while the market rate of return on shares, (pi/pA)∗, falls. However, the rise
of the status-related extra return of shares, (εZ)∗ = φZη × (C/Ω)∗, more than offsets the fall
in the dividend yield so that the effective rate of return on shares, (pi/pA)
∗ + (εZ)∗, depends
positively on φZ . The no-arbitrage condition implies that the effective rate of return on physical
capital also depends positively on φZ . According to the Euler equation for consumption, the
rise in the effective rate of return implies an increase in the growth rate of private consumption,
(C˙/C)∗ = g∗. In other words, the consumption path chosen by the representative household
becomes steeper. The common growth rate of total wealth and its components, physical capital
and shares, increases. Hence, while the proportion of physical capital decreases, its growth rate,
(K˙/K)∗ = g∗, increases.
In the high-φZ-economy firms in the intermediate goods sector face a higher rental rate of
physical capital, r∗, and hence they will charge a higher price for their products according to
the mark-up pricing rule, p∗ = (1/α)× r∗. The higher value of p∗ causes the representative firm
of the final goods sector to choose a lower intensity of intermediate goods, (x/LY )
∗. Since the
high-φZ-economy exhibits a higher common growth rate, g
∗, employment in the R&D sector,
L∗A, is also higher, while the opposite is true for employment in the final goods sector, L
∗
Y . Since
both (x/LY )
∗ and L∗Y depend negatively on φZ , the identical input of the different varieties
x∗ depends negatively on φZ , too. To put it differently: Production and employment of each
variety is lower but the stock of varieties grows at a faster rate, (A˙/A)∗ = g∗. In the high-φZ-
economy, firms in the intermediate goods sector face lower profits, pi∗ = (1− α) p∗x∗, because
the increase in the price p∗ is overcompensated by a decrease in the number of units sold, x∗.
The fall in x∗ implies that each firm in the intermediate goods sector uses less physical capital,
k∗ = x∗. Since the stock of varieties grows faster, also the aggregate stock of physical capital
grows at a higher rate.
In the high-φZ-economy, the lower ratio of intermediate goods to labor, (x/LY )
∗, implies a
lower marginal product of labor. Consequently, the ratio of the real wage to the mass of varieties,
(w/A)∗, is also lower, while, by contrast, the growth rate of the real wage, (w˙/w)∗ = g∗, is higher.
The lower level of (w/A)∗ together with the linear technology in the research sector and perfect
competition imply that the price of blueprints, p∗A, is lower. Since it holds that pZ = pA in
equilibrium, shares are also cheaper. An increase in φZ leads to a decrease of the dividend yield,
(pi/pA)
∗, because pi∗ decreases by a larger percentage value than p∗A. As explained above, the
rise in φZ implies that the composition of the household’s portfolio shifts in favor of shares.
Furthermore, the growth rate of the stock of shares, (Z˙/Z)∗ = (A˙/A)∗ = g∗, rises.
Finally, inspired by Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001a) we end our detailed analysis with a
remark on the social optimality of the decentralized long-run growth rate. The standard Romer
(1990) model exhibits the well-known property that the decentralized long-run economic growth
rate is less than its socially optimal counterpart due to several distortions. In our paper the
quest for status acts so as to increase the decentralized long-run economic growth rate provided
that shares are status relevant, i.e., φZ > 0. A necessary condition for the perfect replication of
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the socially optimal BGP is that the status relevance of shares exceeds that of physical capital,
i.e., φZ > φK > 0. More specifically, we can show that if φK > 0 and (η, φZ) = (η˜, ς˜φK), where
ς˜ > 1 and η˜ are uniquely determined constants, then the decentralized BGP equals its socially
optimal counterpart in the absence of any government intervention. For details see Proposition
5 given in the Supplement.10 Please note that the condition (η, φZ) = (η˜, ς˜φK) can only be
satisfied by pure coincidence, since η, φK , and φZ are exogenously given status parameters.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced status preferences into an R&D-based economic growth model
with three sectors of production (final goods, intermediate goods, and blueprints) to analyze
the impact of status concerns on technological progress and on long-run economic growth. In
contrast to the standard relative wealth approach used in the status literature, we allowed for
the possibility that the components of household’s wealth differ with respect to their status
relevance. The introduction of the generalized relative wealth preferences implies that the
effective rate of return of saving in the form of a particular asset is the sum of its standard market
rate of return and its status-related extra return. In both the Euler equation for consumption
growth and in the no-arbitrage condition, the rental rate of physical capital and the market
rate of return of shares have to be replaced by the corresponding effective rates of return.
First, we analyzed the effects of an increase in the intensity of the quest for status, i.e., a
rise in the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of status-relevant own wealth for consumption.
This rise affects the economy by raising the extra returns of all assets that are status relevant.
As long as this impact effect is not perfectly offset by a decrease in the corresponding market
rate of return, the common steady-state effective rate of return of all assets rises. The resulting
stronger incentive to save causes the demand for shares and hence for new technologies to grow
at a higher rate, which fosters technological progress. According to the underlying production
technology in the R&D sector, the acceleration of technological progress is ultimately due to an
increase in the employment of scientists. Altogether, these effects induce the common long-run
growth rate to rise.
One of our main results is that the effects of an increase in the intensity of the quest for status
on the common growth rate depend crucially upon the status relevance of shares. We started
with two special cases in which explicit solutions for all variables can be easily calculated: i)
if physical capital and shares are equally status relevant, then the status-related extra returns
of these two assets are identical. A rise in the intensity of the quest for status causes the
common growth rate to rise unambiguously. This result is due to the fact that the rise in the
status-related extra return of physical capital and shares is only partially compensated by the
decrease in the rental rate and the dividend yield so that the common effective rate of return
of the two assets increases; ii) if wealth held in the form of shares is irrelevant for status, then
the status-related extra return of shares equals zero. A rise in the MRS of status-relevant own
wealth for consumption causes the extra return of physical capital to increase. But since this
rise is perfectly offset by a fall in the rental rate of capital, the effective rate of return of real
10In the Supplement we derive the socially optimal solution, calculate the values of η˜ and ς˜, and discuss the
resulting properties of the decentralized BGP in detail.
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capital and, hence, the common growth rate remain unchanged. While the growth rate of the
representative household’s wealth remains unchanged, the composition of wealth is altered in
favor of physical capital. Finally, we considered the case in which wealth held in the form
of shares and in the form of physical capital are relevant for status. In this (realistic) case
an increase in the intensity of the quest for status causes the common growth rate to rise
irrespective of the relative status relevance of shares.
Second, we kept the intensity of the quest for status constant and analyzed the implications
of an increase in the relative status relevance of shares. Private households adjust their portfolio
by shifting wealth from physical capital holdings (or bonds/loans) to shares. The rental rate
of capital rises, while the dividend yield falls. However, this fall in the dividend yield is more
than offset by the rise in the status-related extra return of shares so that the effective rate of
return of shares rises. The no-arbitrage condition implies that the effective rate of return of
physical capital rises, too. Consequently, the common growth rate along the BGP increases.
The consumption path chosen by the representative household becomes steeper. While the
proportion of shares increases, not only shares, but also physical capital are accumulated at a
higher rate. Altogether the differential status effect of traditional physical capital versus those
of shares is one potential channel to explain the superior growth patterns of countries in which
entrants/startups have better access to new funds such as the United States.
A final interesting feature of our framework is that, while the standard R&D-based economic
growth model of Romer (1990) exhibits the property that the decentralized long-run growth rate
is unambiguously smaller than its socially optimal counterpart, the externality resulting from
relative wealth preferences reduces the influence of the other distortions provided that shares
matter for status: However, as long as the status relevance of shares does not significantly
exceed that of physical capital, neither the perfect replication of the socially optimal growth
rate nor excessive growth can occur.
With respect to further research we would like to mention two promising avenues: First,
from a public economics point of view it would be interesting to analyze how the socially
optimal taxation/subsidization is influenced by the introduction of relative wealth preferences
and the possibility that the various assets differ with respect to their relative status relevance.
Second, one could abandon the representative agent framework and allow for the heterogeneity
of households. This could yield useful insights when analyzing the driving forces behind wealth
disparities and assessing the conditions and policies under which the poor do not fall too far
behind the rich.
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Appendix
A The representative household’s optimization problem
We dismantle the flow budget constraint (1) into two differential equations for the state variables
K and Z:
K˙ = rK + wL+DZ − pZQ− C, (A.1)
Z˙ = Q. (A.2)
The representative individual chooses time paths for C and Q so as to maximize lifetime utility
given by ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu
[
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)]
dt,
where
Ω ≡ φKK + φZpZZ and Ω¯ ≡ φKK¯ + φZpZZ¯, (A.3)
subject to the differential equations (A.1) and (A.2) and the two initial conditions K (0) = K0
and Z (0) = Z0, where K0 and Z0 are exogenously given. The representative household takes
the time paths of r, w, pZ , D, K¯, and Z¯ as given. The current value Hamiltonian is
H = u
[
C, S
(
φKK + φZpZZ, φKK¯ + φZpZZ¯
)]
+ µK (rK + wL+DZ − pZQ− C) + µZQ,
where the costate variables µK and µZ denote the shadow price of physical capital and shares,
respectively. The necessary optimality conditions for an interior optimum are
µK =
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂C
, (A.4)
µZ = µKpZ , (A.5)
µ˙K = ρµK −
[
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂S
∂S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
∂Ω
φK + µKr
]
, (A.6)
µ˙Z = ρµZ −
[
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂S
∂S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
∂Ω
φZpZ + µKD
]
, (A.7)
where Ω and Ω¯ are given by (A.3). The transversality conditions are given by
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµKK = 0 and lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµZZ = 0. (A.8)
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Since the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in C, Q, K, and Z, the transversality conditions ensure
that the necessary optimality conditions are also sufficient. Using (A.4) and (A.6) we obtain
µ˙K
µ˙K
= −
r +
∂U
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂S
∂S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
∂Ω
φK
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂C
− ρ
 . (A.9)
From (A.5) it follows that
µ˙Z = µ˙KpZ + µK p˙Z . (A.10)
Substituting (A.4), (A.5), and (A.10) into (A.7) it follows that
µ˙K
µK
= −
 p˙ZpZ + DpZ +
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂S
∂S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
∂Ω
φZ
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂C
− ρ
 . (A.11)
Equations (A.9) and (A.11) yield two alternative representations of µ˙K/µK . The required
equality of the right-hand sides of (A.9) and (A.11) yields the no-arbitrage relation of the
economy with relative wealth preferences:
r +
∂U
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂S
∂S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
∂Ω
φK
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂C
=
p˙Z
pZ
+
D
pZ
+
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂S
∂S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
∂Ω
φZ
∂u
(
C, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
))
∂C
. (A.12)
In any symmetric situation, Ω = Ω¯ holds. Moreover, due to Assumption (7), we also have
S(Ω, Ω¯) = S (Ω,Ω) = χ for all Ω > 0, where χ is an exogenously given constant. Equations
(A.4), (A.9), and (A.12) simplify to
µK =
∂u (C,χ)
∂C
, (A.13)
µ˙K
µK
= − [r + εK (C,Ω, χ, φK)− ρ] , (A.14)
r + εK (C,Ω, χ, φK) =
D
pZ
+
p˙Z
pZ
+ εZ (C,Ω, χ, φZ) , (A.15)
where
εK (C,Ω, χ, φK) ≡MRS (C,Ω, χ)× φK , (A.16)
εZ (C,Ω, χ, φZ) ≡MRS (C,Ω, χ)× φZ , (A.17)
MRS (C,Ω, χ) ≡ ∂u (C,χ)
∂S
∂S (Ω,Ω)
∂Ω
[
∂u (C,χ)
∂C
]−1
. (A.18)
Note that (A.15) is equal to the no-arbitrage relation (11) as given in the main text, while
the definitions (A.16)-(A.18) coincide with the definitions εK , εZ , and MRS [see Equations
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(12)–(14)]. From (A.13) it follows that
µ˙K
µK
= C
∂2u (C,χ)
∂C2
[
∂u (C,χ)
∂C
]−1
× C˙
C
. (A.19)
Using (A.14) and (A.19), we obtain the Euler equation for consumption of a decentralized
economy populated by households with relative wealth preferences:
C˙
C
= σS (C,χ)
[
r + εK (C,Ω, χ, φK)− ρ
]
, (A.20)
where
σS (C,χ) ≡ −∂u (C,χ)
∂C
[
C
∂2u (C,χ)
∂C2
]−1
. (A.21)
Note that (A.20) and (A.21) are equivalent to (15) and (16) as given in the main text. Using
(A.5), the transversality conditions (A.8) can be written as
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµKK = 0, lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµKpZZ = 0. (A.22)
Integration of (A.14) yields
µK (t) = µK (0) e
ρt exp
[
−
∫ t
0
[
r(v) + εK (C(v),Ω(v), χ, φK)
]
dv
]
.
The assumption that ∂u (C,χ) /∂C > 0 together with (A.13) implies that µK (t) > 0 for t ≥ 0.
Hence, the transversality conditions (A.22) are equivalent to
lim
t→∞
{
exp
[
−
∫ t
0
[
r(v) + εK(v)
]
dv
]
K
}
= 0,
lim
t→∞
{
exp
[
−
∫ t
0
[
r(v) + εK(v)
]
dv
]
pZZ
}
= 0,
where εK(v) = εK [C(v),Ω(v), χ, φK ]. Note that these conditions are identical to the conditions
(18) as given in the main text.
B The derivation of (50) and (51)
The dynamic evolution of the variables K, C, A, and LA is governed by the four differential
equations (33), (34), (46), (47), where C/Ω is given by (38). It is easily verified from these five
equations that a BGP exhibits the following properties:
LA = constant,
A
K
= constant,
C
K
= constant,
C˙
C
=
K˙
K
=
A˙
A
= constant.
Denote the steady-state value of a variable x by x∗ and the common steady-state growth rate of
C, K, and A by g∗ = (A˙/A)∗ = (K˙/K)∗ = (C˙/C)∗. Using (33), (34), (46), (47), and (38), we
can show that g∗, L∗A, (A/K)
∗, (C/K)∗, and (C/Ω)∗ are determined by the following system of
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equations:
g∗ = λL∗A, (B.1)
g∗ =
[(
A
K
)∗
(L− L∗A)
]1−α
−
(
C
K
)∗
, (B.2)
g∗ = σS
{
α2
[(
A
K
)∗
(L− L∗A)
]1−α
+ φKη
(
C
Ω
)∗
− ρ
}
, (B.3)
0 = − (1− α)
[(
A
K
)∗
(L− L∗A)
]1−α
+
(
C
K
)∗
+ λL∗A
− λ (L− L∗A) +
(φK − φZ) η
α
×
(
C
Ω
)∗
, (B.4)
(
C
Ω
)∗
=
(
C
K
)∗
φK + φZ
1− α
λ
(
L− L∗A
) [(A
K
)∗ (
L− L∗A
)]1−α . (B.5)
From (B.1) and (B.2) it follows that
L∗A =
g∗
λ
, L− L∗A = L∗Y =
λL− g∗
λ
, (B.6)[(
A
K
)∗
(L− L∗A)
]1−α
=
(
Y
K
)∗
= g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗
. (B.7)
Substituting (B.6) and (B.7) into (B.5) yields
(
C
Ω
)∗
=
(
C
K
)∗
φK + φZ
1− α
λL− g∗
[
g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗] . (B.8)
Substituting (B.6)-(B.8) into (B.3) and (B.4) and applying simple transformations, we obtain
the following system of equations that determines g∗ and (C/K)∗:
− (1− α2σS) g∗ + σS
α2 +
φKη
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗
[
g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗]

(
C
K
)∗
= σSρ,
(1 + α) g∗ +
1
α
α2 +
(φK − φZ) η
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗
[
g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗]

(
C
K
)∗
= λL.
These two equations are identical to (50) and (51). 
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C Proofs of Propositions 1 – 3
C.1 The steady-state values of the endogenous variables
First, g∗ and (C/K)∗ are obtained by solving (50)–(51). Second, L∗A, L
∗
Y , and (Y/K)
∗ are
determined by substituting the solutions for g∗ and (C/K)∗ into (48)–(49):
L∗A =
g∗
λ
, L∗Y = L− L∗A =
λL− g∗
λ
, (C.1)(
Y
K
)∗
= g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗
. (C.2)
Third, using (19), (21), (22), (23), (24), (26), (27), (28), (38), (41), (52), (53), (54), and various
equations given in the supplement, the steady-state values of the other endogenous variables
can be expressed as functions of g∗, (C/K)∗, L∗A, L
∗
Y , and (Y/K)
∗:
(
K
A
)∗ 1
L∗Y
=
(
K
A
)∗ 1
L− L∗A
=
[(
Y
K
)∗]−1/(1−α)
, (C.3)
r∗ = α2
[(
K
A
)∗ 1
L− L∗A
]−(1−α)
= α2
(
Y
K
)∗
, (C.4)
p∗ =
1
α
× r∗ = α
(
Y
K
)∗
, (C.5)
x∗ = k∗ =
(
α2
r∗
)1/(1−α)
L∗Y =
λL− g∗
λ
[(
Y
K
)∗]−1/(1−α)
, (C.6)
(
x
LY
)∗
=
[(
Y
K
)∗]−1/(1−α)
, (C.7)
pi∗ = (1− α)αL∗Y
[(
Y
K
)∗]−α/(1−α)
= (1− α)αλL− g
∗
λ
[(
Y
K
)∗]−α/(1−α)
, (C.8)
p∗A =
(1− α)
λ
(
α2
r∗
)α/(1−α)
=
1− α
λ
[(
Y
K
)∗]−α/(1−α)
, (C.9)(
pi
pA
)∗
= αλL∗Y = α (λL− g∗) , (C.10)
(w
A
)∗
= λp∗A = (1− α)
[(
Y
K
)∗]−α/(1−α)
, (C.11)(
C
Ω
)∗
=
(C/K)∗
φK + φZ
1− α
λL− g∗
(
Y
K
)∗ , (C.12)
(
C
Y
)∗
=
(C/K)∗
(Y/K)∗
=
(C/K)∗
g∗ + (C/K)∗
, (C.13)
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
= α2
(
Y
K
)∗
+
φKη (C/K)
∗
φK + φZ
1− α
λL− g∗
(
Y
K
)∗ = 1σS g∗ + ρ, (C.14)
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(
pi
pA
)∗
+
(
εZ
)∗
= α (λL− g∗) + φZη (C/K)
∗
φK + φZ
1− α
λL− g∗
(
Y
K
)∗ = 1σS g∗ + ρ, (C.15)
(
εK
)∗
=
φKη (C/K)
∗
φK + φZ
1− α
λL− g∗
(
Y
K
)∗ = 1σS g∗ + ρ− α2
(
Y
K
)∗
, (C.16)
(
εZ
)∗
=
φZη (C/K)
∗
φK + φZ
1− α
λL− g∗
(
Y
K
)∗ = 1 + ασSσS g∗ + ρ− αλL, (C.17)
(
K
K + pAA
)∗
=
1
1 +
1− α
λL∗Y
(
Y
K
)∗ = 1
1 +
1− α
λL− g∗
(
Y
K
)∗ . (C.18)
C.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of i): Setting φZ = φK = 1 in (50) and (51) yields
− (1− α2σS) g∗ + σS
α2 +
η
1 +
(1− α)
λL− g∗
[
g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗]

(
C
K
)∗
= σSρ,
(1 + α) g∗ + α
(
C
K
)∗
= λL.
Solving this system of two equations for g∗ and (C/K)∗, we obtain:
g∗ =
σS [(α+ η)λL− ρ]
1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]
, (C.19)
(
C
K
)∗
=
λL− (1 + α) g∗
α
=
(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ
α {1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]} . (C.20)
From (C.19) and (C.20) the validity of the conditions (55) and (56) is immediately clear.
Proof of ii): The partial derivative of g∗ with respect to η is given by
∂g∗
∂η
=
σS
{(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ}
{1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]}2 =
ασS
1 + [α+ η (1 + α)]σS
(
C
K
)∗
, (C.21)
where the second representation is obtained by using (C.20). If (55) holds, then (C/K)∗ > 0
and
∂g∗
∂η
> 0 and
∂ (C/K)∗
∂η
= −1 + α
α
∂g∗
∂η
< 0. (C.22)
From (C.19), (C.20), and (C.1)–(C.2) it follows that
L∗A =
g∗
λ
, L∗Y =
λL− g∗
λ
,
(
Y
K
)∗
=
λL− g∗
α
. (C.23)
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Using (C.20), (C.23), and (C.4)–(C.17) the steady-state values of the remaining endogenous
variables can be expressed as functions of g∗ solely:
r∗ = α (λL− g∗) , p∗ = λL− g∗,
x∗ =
α1/(1−α)
λ
(λL− g∗)−α/(1−α) ,
(
x
LY
)∗
=
(
λL− g∗
α
)−1/(1−α)
,
p∗A =
1− α
λ
(
λL− g∗
α
)−α/(1−α)
,
(w
A
)∗
= (1− α)
(
λL− g∗
α
)−α/(1−α)
,
pi∗ =
(1− α)α1/(1−α)
λ
(λL− g∗)−(2α−1)/(1−α) ,
(
pi
pA
)∗
= α (λL− g∗) ,(
C
Ω
)∗
= λL− (1 + α) g∗,
(
C
Y
)∗
=
λL− (1 + α) g∗
λL− g∗ ,
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
=
(
pi
pA
)∗
+
(
εZ
)∗
=
1
σS
g∗ + ρ,
(
εK
)∗
=
(
εZ
)∗
=
1 + ασS
σS
g∗ − αλL+ ρ.
Taking into account that ∂g∗/∂η > 0 holds [see (C.22)], it is obvious from the equations given
above that
∂v∗
∂η
< 0 for v =
C
K
,
C
Y
,
C
Ω
, LY ,
Y
K
, r, p,
pi
pA
,
∂v∗
∂η
> 0 for v = LA,
x
LY
, x, εK , εZ , r + εK ,
pi
pA
+ εZ , pA,
w
A
,
sgn
(
∂pi∗
∂η
)
= sgn (2α− 1) .
These results prove the validity of the assertions made in part ii) of Proposition 1.
Proof of iii): Using (C.23) and (C.18), we finally obtain(
K
K + pAA
)∗
=
[
1 +
1− α
λL− g∗
λL− g∗
α
]−1
= α⇒
(
pAA
K + pAA
)∗
= 1− α. 
C.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of i): Setting φZ = 0 in (50) and (51) yields
− (1− α2σS) g∗ + σS (α2 + η)(C
K
)∗
= σSρ,
(1 + α) g∗ +
1
α
(
α2 + η
)(C
K
)∗
= λL.
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Solving this system of two equations for g∗ and (C/K)∗, we obtain
g∗ =
σS (αλL− ρ)
1 + ασS
, (C.24)(
C
K
)∗
=
α
[(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ]
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)
. (C.25)
The validity of the conditions (57) and (58) is immediately clear.
Proof of ii): Equations (C.24) and (C.25) imply that
∂g∗
∂η
= 0 and
∂ (C/K)∗
∂η
< 0. (C.26)
From (C.1)–(C.17) it follows that the variables L∗A, L
∗
Y , (pi/pA)
∗, r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
, (pi/pA)
∗ +
(
εZ
)∗
,
and
(
εZ
)∗
can be expressed as functions of g∗ solely. Hence, taking into account that ∂g∗/∂η = 0
[see (C.26)] we obtain
∂v∗
∂η
= 0 for v = LA, LY , r + ε
K , pi/pA, ε
Z , (pi/pA) + ε
Z .
The result with respect to εZ can also be inferred directly from the fact that εZ = 0 for φZ = 0.
Using (C.2) and (C.26) we obtain
∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η
=
∂g∗
∂η
+
∂ (C/K)∗
∂η
=
∂ (C/K)∗
∂η
< 0. (C.27)
From (C.1)–(C.17) it also follows that the variables r∗, p∗, (x/LY )∗, p∗A, and (w/A)
∗ can be
expressed as functions of (Y/K)∗ solely. It is verified at a glance that
∂v∗
∂ (Y/K)∗
{
> 0, for v = r, p,
< 0, for v = x/LY , pA, w/A.
Hence, using the fact that ∂ (Y/K)∗ /∂η < 0 [see (C.27)], we obtain
∂v∗
∂η
{
< 0, for v = r, p,
> 0, for v = x/LY , pA, w/A.
The variables x∗, pi∗, and
(
εK
)∗
can be expressed as functions of both g∗ and (Y/K)∗, where
∂v∗
∂ (Y/K)∗
< 0 for v = x, pi, εK .
Taking into account that ∂g∗/∂η = 0 [see (C.26)] and ∂ (Y/K)∗ /∂η < 0 [see (C.27)] we get
∂v∗
∂η
> 0 for v = x, pi, εK .
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Setting φZ = 0 in (C.12) yields (C/Ω)
∗ = (1/φK) (C/K)∗. Hence,
∂ (C/Ω)∗
∂η
=
1
φK
∂ (C/K)∗
∂η
< 0.
Finally, using (C.13) and taking into account that ∂g∗/∂η = 0 and ∂ (C/K)∗ /∂η < 0 [see
(C.26)], we obtain(
C
Y
)∗
=
(C/K)∗
g∗ + (C/K)∗
⇒ ∂ (C/Y )
∗
∂η
=
g∗
[g∗ + (C/K)∗]2
∂ (C/K)∗
∂η
< 0.
The validity of the assertions made in part ii) of proposition 2 is now easily verified by summa-
rizing the results derived above in the following compact way:
∂v∗
∂η
= 0 for v = LA, LY , r + ε
K ,
pi
pA
, εZ ,
∂v∗
∂η
< 0 for v =
C
K
,
C
Ω
,
C
Y
,
Y
K
, r, p,
∂v∗
∂η
> 0 for v =
x
LY
, x, pi, εK , pA,
w
A
.
Proof of iii) Using (C.24), (C.25), (C.1), and (C.2) we obtain
L∗Y = L− L∗A =
λL+ σSρ
λ (1 + ασS)
,
(
Y
K
)∗
=
(
1 + ησS
)
αλL+ (α− η)σSρ
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)
.
Substituting these results into (C.18) yields(
K
K + pAA
)∗
=
[
1 +
1− α
λL∗Y
(
Y
K
)∗]−1
(C.28)
=
(
α2 + η
) (
λL+ σSρ
)
α (λL+ σSρ) + η {[1 + ασS (1− α)]λL+ ασSρ} . (C.29)
Differentiating (C.28) with respect to η and taking into account that ∂ (Y/K)∗ /∂η < 0 and
∂L∗Y /∂η = 0, we obtain
∂ [K/ (K + pAA)]
∗
∂η
= −
[
1 +
1− α
λL∗Y
(
Y
K
)∗]−2 1− α
λL∗Y
× ∂ (Y/K)
∗
∂η
> 0.
It is obvious from (C.29) that (
K
K + pAA
)∗∣∣∣∣
η=0
= α.
Moreover, recalling that g∗ is strictly positive if and only if ρ < αλL holds, we obtain
lim
η→∞
(
K
K + pAA
)∗
=
λL+ σSρ
λL+ σSρ+ (1− α)σS (αλL− ρ) < 1.
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These results prove the validity of all assertions made in part iii) of Proposition 2. 
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Introducing the definition c ≡ C/K, equations (50) and (51) can be written as
M1 (g
∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ) = 0 and M2 (g∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ) = 0,
where
M1 ≡ −
(
1− α2σS) g∗ + σS
α2 + φKη
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗ (g
∗ + c∗)
 c∗ − σSρ,
M2 ≡ (1 + α) g∗ + 1
α
α2 + (φK − φZ) η
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗ (g
∗ + c∗)
 c∗ − λL.
In the Supplement we show that quite weak assumptions are sufficient for the existence of a
unique solution
g∗ = Πg (η, φK , φZ) , c∗ = Πc (η, φK , φZ) ,
that is economically meaningful in the sense that g∗ > 0 and c∗ > 0. The partial derivatives of g∗
and c∗ with respect to the status parameters can be derived by means of implicit differentiation:
∂g∗
∂par
=
1
Ψ
(
∂M2
∂c∗
∂M1
∂par
− ∂M1
∂c∗
∂M2
∂par
)
, par = η, φK , φZ ,
∂c∗
∂par
=
1
Ψ
(
−∂M2
∂g∗
∂M1
∂par
+
∂M1
∂g∗
∂M2
∂par
)
, par = η, φK , φZ ,
where
Ψ ≡ ∂M1
∂c∗
∂M2
∂g∗
− ∂M1
∂g∗
∂M2
∂c∗
. (C.30)
Note that the partial derivatives of M1 and M2 are evaluated at
(g∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ) = (Πg (η, φK , φZ) ,Πc (η, φK , φZ) , η, φK , φZ) .
In other words, we consider the following expressions: ∂Mj/∂ω|M1=M2=0, ω = g∗, c∗, and par.
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It can be shown by tedious calculations that
∂M1
∂g∗
= − (1− α2σS)− ηφKφZ (1− α)σSc∗ (λL+ c∗)
[φK(λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
, (C.31)
∂M1
∂c∗
= α2σS +
ηφKσ
S (λL− g∗) [φK(λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) g∗]
[φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
, (C.32)
∂M2
∂g∗
= (1 + α)− η (φK − φZ)φZ (1− α) (λL+ c
∗) c∗
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
, (C.33)
∂M2
∂c∗
= α+
η (φK − φZ) (λL− g∗) [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) g∗]
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
. (C.34)
Unfortunately, if φZ > φK , then the sign of ∂M2/∂c
∗ cannot be determined immediately.
However, using the fact that
M2 = 0⇔ η (φK − φZ) (λL− g
∗)
φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) =
α [λL− (1 + α) g∗ − αc∗]
c∗
we can show that
∂M2
∂c∗
=
φZα (1− α) (c∗)2 + [φK(λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) g∗] [λL− (1 + α) g∗]
c∗ [φK(λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] (C.35)
holds at the steady state. From (C.31), (C.32), and (C.35) it follows that
∂M1
∂g∗
< 0,
∂M1
∂c∗
> 0,
∂M2
∂c∗
> 0 (C.36)
holds at the steady state, regardless of whether 0 < φZ ≤ φK or 0 < φK < φZ .
From (C.30), (C.33), and (C.36) it is obvious that
φZ ≥ φK ⇒ ∂M2
∂g∗
> 0⇒ Ψ > 0. (C.37)
To determine the sign of Ψ for the case φZ < φK we make use of the fact that Ψ can be
expressed as
Ψ =
η
[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ (1− α2σS)] (λL− g∗) [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) g∗]
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
+ α
(
1 + σSα
)
+
ηφ2Z (1− α)α2σSc∗ (λL+ c∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
. (C.38)
Equation (C.38) implies that
φZ < φK ⇒ φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ (1− α2σS) > 0⇒ Ψ > 0. (C.39)
From (C.37) and (C.39) it follows that
Ψ > 0 for φZ ≥ 0. (C.40)
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To analyze the effects of changes in φZ , we substitute
∂M1
∂φZ
= − ηφK (1− α)σ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗) (g∗ + c∗)
[φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
< 0,
∂M2
∂φZ
= −ηφKc
∗ (λL− g∗) [(λL− g∗) + (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
< 0
into the general representation of the solutions. This yields
∂g∗
∂φZ
=
1
Ψ
φKησ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗)2 {φK (α2 + η) (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) [α2 (g∗ + c∗) +ηg∗]}
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]3
,
∂c∗
∂φZ
=
1
Ψ
φKηc
∗ (λL− g∗) [(1 + σSα) (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) + (1− α2σS) (λL− g∗)]
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
+
1
Ψ
φKφZη
2 (1− α)σS (c∗)2 (λL− g∗) (λL+ c∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]3
.
These solutions imply that
φK > 0 ⇒ ∂g
∗
∂φZ
> 0 and
∂c∗
∂φZ
> 0. (C.41)
From (C.1), (C.9), (C.13), (C.14), and (C.16) it follows that the variables L∗A, L
∗
Y , (pi/pA)
∗,
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
, (pi/pA)
∗ +
(
εZ
)∗
, and
(
εZ
)∗
can be expressed as functions of g∗ solely, where
∂v∗
∂g∗
{
> 0 for v = LA, r + ε
K , (pi/pA) + ε
Z , εZ ,
< 0 for v = LY , pi/pA.
Hence, using the fact that ∂g∗/∂φZ > 0 [see (C.41)], we obtain
∂v∗
∂φZ
{
> 0 for v = LA, r + ε
K , (pi/pA) + ε
Z , εZ ,
< 0 for v = LY , pi/pA.
From (C.41) and (C.2) it follows that
∂ (Y/K)∗
∂φZ
=
∂g∗
∂φZ
+
∂c∗
∂φZ
> 0. (C.42)
From (C.1)–(C.17) it follows that the variables r∗, p∗, (x/LY )∗, p∗A, (w/A)
∗ can be expressed
as functions of (Y/K)∗ solely, where
∂v∗
∂ (Y/K)∗
{
> 0 for v = r, p,
< 0 for v = x/LY , pA, w/A.
Hence, using the fact that ∂ (Y/K)∗ /∂φZ > 0 [see (C.42)], we obtain
∂v∗
∂φZ
{
> 0 for v = r, p,
< 0 for v = x/LY , pA, w/A.
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Equations (C.6), (C.8), and (C.18) imply that the variables x∗, pi∗, and [K/ (K + pAA)]∗ can
be expressed as functions of both g∗ and (Y/K)∗, where
∂v∗
∂g∗
< 0 for v = x, pi,
K
K + pAA
,
∂v∗
∂ (Y/K)∗
< 0 for v = x, pi,
K
K + pAA
.
Taking into account that ∂g∗/∂φZ > 0 and ∂ (Y/K)∗ /∂φZ > 0, we obtain
∂v∗
∂φZ
< 0 for v = x, pi,
K
K + pAA
.
The results derived above prove the validity of the assertions made in Proposition 3. 
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Supplement
D The decentralized equilibrium: further results
D.1 Derivation of Equation (32)
From the flow budget constraint of the representative household (1) it follows that
K˙ = rK + wL+DZ − C − pZZ˙.
Using i) the labor market equilibrium condition, L = LY + LA, ii) the normalization of the
number of shares, Z = A (⇒ Z˙ = A˙), iii) the equilibrium condition of the market for blueprints,
pA = pZ , and iv) the assumption that the operating profit of firms in the intermediate goods
sector is fully distributed in the form of dividends at any time t, D (t) = pi (t), we obtain
K˙ = rK + w (LY + LA)− C + piA− pAA˙.
Employing i) the equilibrium condition of the rental market of real capital, K = Ak, ii) the
fact that the identical operating profit of the firms in the intermediate goods sector is equal to
pi = px − rk, and iii) the production function for blueprints of the representative firm in the
R&D sector, A˙ = λALA, we get
K˙ = rAk + wLY + wLA − C + (px− rk)A− pAλALA
= (wLY +Apx)− C − (pAλALA − wLA) .
Perfect competition in the R&D sector and in the final goods sector implies pAA˙ − wLA =
pAλALA − wLA = 0 and wLY +Apx = Y , such that
K˙ = Y − C. (D.1)
Obviously, (D.1) is equivalent to (32) as given in the main text. 
D.2 Derivation of Equation (34)
Using that firms in the intermediate goods sector produce identical quantities in Equation (19)
implies that
Y = L1−αY
∫ A
0
xα di = L1−αY Ax
α = (ALY )
1−α (Ax)α . (D.2)
Taking into account that xi = ki for i ∈ [0, A], we obtain ki = k for i ∈ [0, A], where k = x.
From k = x and K = Ak it then follows that Ax = Ak = K. Substituting this into (D.2) and
using L = LY + LA, we obtain
Y = Kα (ALY )
1−α = Kα [A (L− LA)]1−α . (D.3)
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Using (D.3) and Y = K˙ + C, we finally get
K˙
K
=
Y
K
− C
K
=
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
− C
K
. (D.4)
Obviously, (D.4) is equivalent to (34) as given in the main text. 
D.3 Derivation of Equation (35)
Solving (28) for r and taking into account that L = LY + LA, we obtain
r = α2
(
K
ALY
)−(1−α)
= α2
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
. (D.5)
Substituting (D.5) into (15) yields
C˙
C
= σS (C,χ)
{
α2
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
+ εK (C,Ω, χ, φK)− ρ
}
. (D.6)
The differential equation (D.6) is identical to (35) as given in the main text. 
D.4 Derivation of Equation (37)
Taking into account that Z = A and pA = pZ hold in equilibrium, (6) implies
Ω = φKK + φZpZZ = φKK + φZpAA. (D.7)
Equation (26) and the labor market equilibrium condition (27) imply that
pA =
1
λ
w
A
.
The first order condition of the representative firm in the final goods sector with respect to the
choice of labor input (20) together with the labor market equilibrium condition (27) and the
fact thatxi = x for i ∈ [0, A] holds, implies that
w = (1− α)
∫ A
0
(
xi
LY
)α
di = (1− α)A
(
x
LY
)α
.
Using x = k and K = Ak, we obtain
x
LY
=
k
LY
=
Ak
ALY
=
K
ALY
=
K
A (L− LA) . (D.8)
The last three results imply
w
A
= (1− α)
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
, (D.9)
and
pA =
1− α
λ
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
. (D.10)
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Substituting (D.10) into (D.7) yields
Ω = φKK + φZ
(1− α)A
λ
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
. (D.11)
Obviously, (D.11) is equivalent to (37) as given in the main text. 
D.5 Derivation of Equations (54) and (36)
Using pA = pZ and D (t) = pi (t), we obtain from (11) that
r + εK (C,Ω, χ, φK) =
pi
pA
+
p˙A
pA
+ εZ (C,Ω, χ, φZ) . (D.12)
From (24) and (D.5) it follows that
pi = (1− α)α(1+α)/(1−α)r−α/(1−α)LY = (1− α)α
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
LY . (D.13)
Using (D.13), (D.10), and L = LY + LA, we get
pi
pA
= αλLY = αλ (L− LA) . (D.14)
Note that (D.14) equals (54) as given in the main text.
From (D.10) it follows that
p˙A
pA
= α
K˙
K
− αA˙
A
+ α
L˙A
L− LA . (D.15)
Substituting (D.15) into (D.12) yields
L˙A = (L− LA)
{
1
α
[
r + εK −
(
pi
pA
+ εZ
)]
− K˙
K
+
A˙
A
}
, (D.16)
where εK = εK (C,Ω, χ, φK) and ε
Z = εZ (C,Ω, χ, φZ). Substituting (D.5), (D.14), (34) [=
(D.4)], and (33) into (D.16), we obtain
L˙A = (L− LA)
{
− (1− α)
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
+
C
K
+ λLA
−λ (L− LA) + ε
K (C,Ω, χ, φK)− εZ (C,Ω, χ, φK)
α
}
. (D.17)
The differential equation (D.17) is identical to (36) as given in the main text. 
D.6 Derivation of (44) and (45)
The instantaneous utility function as given by (42),
u (C, S) =
1
1− θ
{[
Cξh (S)
]1−θ − 1} , ξ > 0, θ > 0, 1 + ξ (θ − 1) > 0,
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where h (S) > 0 and h′ (S) > 0, and the ratio specification of the status function as given by
(43),
S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
= ϕ
(
Ω/Ω¯
)
, ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ ≤ 0,
exhibit the following properties:
∂u (C, S)
∂C
= ξCξ(1−θ)−1 [h (S)]1−θ > 0,
∂u (C, S)
∂S
= Cξ(1−θ) [h (S)]−θ h′ (S) > 0,
∂2u (C, S)
∂C2
= − [1 + ξ (θ − 1)] ξCξ(1−θ)−2 [h (S)]1−θ < 0,
S (Ω,Ω) = ϕ (Ω/Ω) = ϕ (1) ≡ χ,
∂S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
∂Ω
= ϕ′
(
Ω/Ω¯
)× (1/Ω¯) , ∂S (Ω,Ω)
∂Ω
= ϕ′ (1) (1/Ω) .
Evaluating the partial derivatives of the instantaneous utility function U at (C, S) = (C,χ) =
(C,ϕ (1)) and substituting the resulting expressions as well as the result for ∂S (Ω,Ω) /∂Ω into
the definitions of σS (C,χ) and MRS (C,Ω, χ) as given by (14) and (16), respectively, we obtain:
σS (C,χ) ≡ −∂u (C,χ)
∂C
[
C
∂2u (C,χ)
∂C2
]−1
=
1
1 + ξ (θ − 1) , (D.18)
MRS (C,Ω, χ) ≡ ∂u (C,χ)
∂S
∂S (Ω,Ω)
∂Ω
[
∂u (C,χ)
∂C
]−1
=
1
ξ
h′ (ϕ (1))ϕ′ (1)
h (ϕ (1))
× C
Ω
. (D.19)
Equation (D.18) implies that the symmetric effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution
under relative wealth preferences does not depend on C, i.e., ∂σS (C,χ) /∂C = 0. From (D.19)
it follows that the symmetric marginal rate of substitution of status-relevant own wealth Ω for
consumption C, MRS (C,Ω, χ), depends linearly on (C/Ω):
MRS (C,Ω, χ) = η × C
Ω
, where η ≡ β
ξ
> 0, β ≡ h
′ [ϕ (1)]ϕ′ (1)
h [ϕ (1)]
=
h′ (χ)ϕ′ (1)
h (χ)
> 0.
Consequently, εK and εZ depend linearly on (C/Ω), too:
εK = φKη × C
Ω
, and εZ = φZη × C
Ω
.
The results given above prove the validity of (44) and (45). 
E The BGP – Existence, Uniqueness and its Dependence on
the Status Parameters
E.1 Existence and Uniqueness of the Steady State
E.1.1 Preliminaries
From (50) and (51) it follows that the steady state values g∗ and c∗, where
c ≡ C/K, (E.1)
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satisfy the equations
M1
(
g∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ ,σS , ρ, λ, L, α
)
= 0, (E.2)
M2
(
g∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ ,σS , ρ, λ, L, α
)
= 0, (E.3)
where
M1 ≡ −
(
1− α2σS) g∗ + σS
α2 + φKη
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗ (g
∗ + c∗)
 c∗ − σSρ, (E.4)
M2 ≡ (1 + α) g∗ + 1
α
α2 + (φK − φZ) η
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗ (g
∗ + c∗)
 c∗ − λL. (E.5)
We analyze the conditions for the existence of a unique, economically meaningful solution
(g∗, c∗). From (E.2)–(E.5) it follows that
g∗ = Πg
(
η, φK , φZ ,σ
S , ρ, λ, L, α
)
,
c∗ = Πc
(
η, φK , φZ ,σ
S , ρ, λ, L, α
)
.
Moreover, we study the effects of changes in the status parameters η, φK , and φZ on g
∗ and c∗.
For this reason, we will use a simplified general representation of the steady state values:
g∗ = Πg (η, φK , φZ) , (E.6)
c∗ = Πc (η, φK , φZ) . (E.7)
These results are the starting point for a complete analysis of the properties of the BGP.
E.1.2 Special Case φZ = 0
First, we analyze the special case in which shares issued by entrants – in contrast to physical
capital used by incumbents – do not matter for status, i.e., φZ = 0 and φK > 0. Setting φZ = 0
in (E.4) and (E.5) it is easily verified that both M1 = 0 and M2 = 0 imply a linear relation
between c∗ and g∗:
c∗|M1=0 =
σSρ+
(
1− α2σS) g∗
σS (α2 + η)
,
c∗|M2=0 =
α [λL− (1 + α) g∗]
α2 + η
.
(E.8)
The graphical representation of these results in the (g∗, c∗)-plane (see Figure 1) exhibits the
following properties:
i) The straight line that corresponds to M1 = 0 (henceforth, the M1 = 0-line) is positively
sloped if and only if
1− α2σS > 0⇔ σS < 1/α2. (E.9)
In this paper we assume that (E.9) holds. Note that this assumption is quite weak. For instance,
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if α = 1/3, then 1/α2 = 9.
ii) The straight line that corresponds to M2 = 0 (henceforth, the M2 = 0-line) is nega-
tively sloped. From L∗Y = (λL− g∗) /λ > 0 and L∗A = g∗/λ > 0 it follows that economically
meaningful rates of growth satisfy the condition
0 < g∗ < λL. (E.10)
In order to ensure that not only L∗Y > 0 and L
∗
A > 0, but also c
∗ > 0 holds, we have to restrict
the analysis to situations in which
0 < g∗ <
λL
1 + α
(E.11)
holds. Assumption (E.11) is slightly stronger than assumption (E.10). However, we can easily
show that it is not at all restrictive. From L∗A = g
∗/λ > 0 it follows that condition (E.11) is
equivalent to
0 <
L∗A
L
<
1
1 + α
(E.12)
Condition (E.12) requires that the labor input of the R&D sector is less than 100/ (1 + α)
percent of total labor input. From α ∈ (0, 1) it follows that 100/ (1 + α) > 50. For instance,
if α = 1/3, then 100/ (1 + α) = 75. Hence, condition (E.12) is not at all restrictive because
it allows for an unrealistically high employment share of the R&D sector and hence for an
excessive growth rate.
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Figure 1: BGP determination of c∗ and g∗ in case of φZ = 0
To ensure that there exists an economically meaningful steady state, i.e., a point of intersec-
tion of the M1 = 0-line and the M2 = 0-line in which g
∗ > 0 and c∗ > 0 , we have to introduce
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a further assumption. Taking into account that
c∗|M1=0 =

0 for g∗ = − σ
Sρ
1− α2σS
ρ
α2 + η
for g∗ = 0
(1 + α)σSρ+
(
1− α2σS)λL
(1 + α) (α2 + η)σS
for g∗ =
λL
1 + α
c∗|M2=0 =

αλL
α2 + η
for g∗ = 0
0 for g∗ =
λL
1 + α
it can be verified at first glance from a graphical representation (see Figure 1) that this missing
assumption is given by
ρ
α2 + η
<
αλL
α2 + η
⇔ αλL− ρ > 0. (E.13)
Assumption (E.13) implies that the negatively sloped M2 = 0-line intersects the vertical axis
at a point that is above the point at which the positively sloped M1 = 0-line intersects. At
g∗ = λL/ (1 + α) the M2 = 0-line intersects the horizontal axis, while the M1 = 0-line assumes
a strictly positive value.
The unique steady-state values that correspond to φZ = 0 are given by
g∗ =
σS (αλL− ρ)
1 + ασS
, c∗ =
α
[(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ]
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)
. (E.14)
E.1.3 General Case φZ > 0
It can be shown by tedious calculations that M1 = 0 implies the following quadratic equation:
Ω2 (c
∗)2 + Ω1c∗ + Ω0 = 0,
where
Ω2 ≡ α2σSφZ (1− α) , (E.15)
Ω1 ≡ φK
(
α2 + η
)
σS (λL− g∗)− φZ (1− α)
[(
1− 2α2σS) g∗ + σSρ] , (E.16)
Ω0 ≡ −
[(
1− α2σS) g∗ + σSρ] [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) g∗] . (E.17)
It is obvious that Ω2 > 0. From (E.10) and (E.9) it follows that Ω0 < 0. Hence, it is clear that
the quadratic equation has a negative and a positive root. (The validity of this assertion is, for
instance, verified at first glance by a graphical representation of the quadratic equation). Since
only the positive root makes sense from an economic point of view, we obtain
c∗|M1=0 =
−Ω1 +
√
Ω21 − 4Ω2Ω0
2Ω2
. (E.18)
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From (E.15)–(E.17) it follows that
Ω2 = Ω2 (φZ , ...) > 0, Ω1 = Ω1 (g
∗, φK , φZ , η, ...) , Ω0 = Ω0 (g∗, φK , φZ , ...) < 0.
Hence, it is clear that
c∗|M1=0 = Ξ1 (g∗, φK , φZ , η, ...) > 0, (E.19)
where Ξ1 is defined as the right-hand side of (E.18). The graphical representation of (E.19) in
the (g∗, c∗)-plane will be called M1 = 0-curve.
In the special case in which physical capital is irrelevant for status (φK = 0) and φZ > 0,
we obtain the following linear relation between c∗ and g∗ that is unaffected by changes in η or
φZ :
c∗|M1=0 =
(
1− α2σS) g∗ + σSρ
α2σS
.
Hence, if φK = 0, then the M1 = 0-line is positively sloped and its position depends neither on
η nor on φZ .
The analysis of the general case in which φK > 0 and φZ > 0 holds, is much more compli-
cated. In order to derive the signs of the partial derivatives of (E.18) with respect to g∗, φK , φZ ,
and η we can either differentiate (E.18) with respect to these variables and thereby taking into
account (E.15)–(E.17) or make use of the fact that
M1
(
g∗,Ξ1 (g∗, φK , φZ , η, ...) , η, φK , φZ
)
= 0
holds and apply the implicit function theorem. It can be shown by tedious calculations that
∂M1
∂g∗
= − (1− α2σS)− ηφKφZ (1− α)σSc∗ (λL+ c∗)
[φK(λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
< 0, (E.20)
∂M1
∂c∗
= α2σS +
ηφKσ
S (λL− g∗) [φK(λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) g∗]
[φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
> 0, (E.21)
∂M1
∂η
=
φKσ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) > 0, (E.22)
∂M1
∂φK
=
ηφZσ
S (1− α) c∗ (λL− g∗) (g∗ + c∗)
[φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
> 0, (E.23)
∂M1
∂φZ
= − ηφK (1− α)σ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗) (g∗ + c∗)
[φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
< 0. (E.24)
Using these results we obtain
∂c∗
∂g∗
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
= −
∂M1
∂g∗
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
∂M1
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
> 0,
∂c∗
∂η
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
= −
∂M1
∂η
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
∂M1
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
< 0,
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∂c∗
∂φK
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
= −
∂M1
∂φK
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
∂M1
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
< 0,
∂c∗
∂φZ
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
= −
∂M1
∂φZ
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
∂M1
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M1=0
> 0.
The notation ∂M1/∂ω|M1=0 expresses the fact that the partial derivative of M1 with respect to
ω is evaluated at (g∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ) =
(
g∗,Ξ1 (g∗, φK , φZ , η, ...) , η, φK , φZ
)
. Hence, the M1 = 0-
curve is positively sloped. A rise in η or φK causes the M1 = 0-curve to shift downwards, while
a rise in φZ leads to an upward shift.
Next, we will discuss the properties of the M2 = 0-curve. It can be shown that M2 = 0
implies the following quadratic equation:
Λ2 (c
∗)2 + Λ1c∗ + Λ0 = 0, (E.25)
where
Λ2 ≡ α2φZ (1− α) , (E.26)
Λ1 ≡
[
(φK − φZ)
(
α2 + η
)− φZα (1− 2α)] (λL− g∗) + 2α2φZ (1− α) g∗, (E.27)
Λ0 ≡ −α [φK(λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) g∗] [λL− (1 + α) g∗] . (E.28)
It is obvious that Λ2 > 0. From (E.10) and (E.9) it follows that Λ0 < 0. Hence, it is clear
that the quadratic equation has a negative and a positive root. Since only the positive root is
economically meaningful we obtain
c∗|M2=0 =
−Λ1 +
√
Λ21 − 4Λ2Λ0
2Λ2
. (E.29)
From (E.26)–(E.28) it follows that
Λ2 = Λ2 (φZ , ...) > 0, Λ1 = Λ1 (g
∗, φK , φZ , η, ...) , Λ0 = Λ0 (g∗, φK , φZ , ...) < 0.
Hence, it is clear that
c∗|M2=0 = Ξ2 (g∗, φK , φZ , η, ...) > 0, (E.30)
where Ξ2 is defined as the right-hand side of (E.29). The graphical representation of (E.30) in
the (g∗, c∗)-plane will be called M2 = 0-curve.
In the special case in which φK = φZ (see Figure 2) we obtain the following linear relation
between c∗ and g∗:
c∗|M2=0 =
λL− (1 + α) g∗
α
. (E.31)
Obviously, the M2 = 0-line is negatively sloped and its position does not depend on η. The
M2 = 0-line intersects the positively sloped M1 = 0-curve at
g∗ =
σS [(α+ η)λL− ρ]
1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]
, c∗ =
(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ
α {1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]} . (E.32)
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Figure 2: BGP determination of c∗ and g∗ in case of φZ = φK
In the general case in which φK 6= φZ holds, the analysis of the M2 = 0-curve is much more
complicated. To derive the signs of the partial derivatives of (E.30), c∗|M2=0 = Ξ2 (g∗, φK , φZ , η, ...),
with respect to g∗, φK , φZ , and η we can either differentiate (E.29) with respect to these vari-
ables and thereby taking into account (E.26)–(E.28) or make use of the fact that
M2
(
g∗,Ξ2 (g∗, φK , φZ , η, ...) , η, φK , φZ
)
= 0
holds and apply the implicit function theorem. It can be shown by tedious calculations that
∂M2
∂g∗
= (1 + α)− η (φK − φZ)φZ (1− α) (λL+ c
∗) c∗
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
, (E.33)
∂M2
∂c∗
= α+
η (φK − φZ) (λL− g∗) [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) g∗]
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
, (E.34)
∂M2
∂η
=
(φK − φZ) c∗ (λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] , (E.35)
∂M2
∂φK
=
ηφZc
∗ (λL− g∗) [(λL− g∗) + (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
> 0, (E.36)
∂M2
∂φZ
= −ηφKc
∗ (λL− g∗) [(λL− g∗) + (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
< 0. (E.37)
It is easily verified that
M2 = 0⇔ η (φK − φZ) (λL− g
∗)
φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) =
α [λL− (1 + α) g∗ − αc∗]
c∗
. (E.38)
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Using this result we obtain
∂M2
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
=
φZα (1− α) (c∗)2 + [φK(λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) g∗] [λL− (1 + α) g∗]
c∗ [φK(λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] . (E.39)
The notation ∂M2/∂ω|M2=0 expresses the fact that the partial derivative of M2 with respect to
ω is evaluated at (g∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ) =
(
g∗,Ξ2 (g∗, φK , φZ , η, ...) , η, φK , φZ
)
. This transformation
shows that
∂M2
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
> 0
regardless of whether φZ ≤ φK or φZ > φK holds.
The properties of theM2 = 0-curve are given by the following partial derivatives of c
∗|M2=0 =
Ξ2 (g∗, φK , φZ , η, ...):
∂c∗
∂g∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
= −
∂M2
∂g∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
∂M2
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
⇒ sgn
(
∂c∗
∂g∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
)
= −sgn
(
∂M2
∂g∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
)
,
∂c∗
∂η
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
= −
∂M2
∂η
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
∂M2
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
⇒ sgn
(
∂c∗
∂η
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
)
= −sgn
(
∂M2
∂η
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
)
= −sgn (φK − φZ) ,
∂c∗
∂φK
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
= −
∂M2
∂φK
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
∂M2
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
< 0,
∂c∗
∂φZ
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
= −
∂M2
∂φZ
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
∂M2
∂c∗
∣∣∣∣
M2=0
> 0.
A rise in φZ causes the M2 = 0-curve to shift upwards, while a rise in φK leads to a downward
shift. A rise in η causes the M2 = 0-curve to shift downwards if φK > φZ , while an upward
shift obtains if φK < φZ .
With respect to the slope of the M2 = 0-curve things are more complicated. The M2 = 0-
curve is negatively sloped if and only if ∂M2/∂g
∗|M2=0 > 0. From (E.33) it follows that
φZ ≥ φK is sufficient for ∂M2/∂g∗|M2=0 > 0. Moreover, it is obvious that ∂M2/∂g∗|M2=0 > 0
also holds for φZ < φK as long as η is sufficiently small. Unfortunately, we were not able to
give an analytical proof that this property also holds for “large” values of η. We tried several
illustrations. Irrespective of the magnitude of η we obtained a negatively sloped M2 = 0-curve.
Figure 3 supports the general validity of this result. In Figure 3 we depicted the M2 = 0-curves
that correspond to the special cases φZ = 0 and φZ = φK > 0 [see (E.8) and (E.31)]:
c∗|M2=0;φZ=0 =
α [λL− (1 + α) g∗]
α2 + η
,
c∗|M2=0;φZ=φK =
λL− (1 + α) g∗
α
.
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Both curves intersect the horizontal axis at g∗ = λL/ (1 + α). Since
c∗|M2=0;φZ=0 =
α2
α2 + η
c∗|M2=0;φZ=φK
holds, the M2 = 0-curve that corresponds to φZ = 0 is flatter than its φZ = φK-counterpart.
From ∂c∗/∂φZ |M2=0 > 0 it follows that if 0 < φZ < φK , then the resulting M2 = 0|0<φZ<φK -
curve (dashed line) lies above the M2 = 0|φZ=0-curve and below the M2 = 0|φZ=φK -curve.
FIGURE 3c*
λL
1+α
g*
M2=0|ΦZ=0
M2=0|ΦZ=ΦK
M2=0|0<ΦZ<ΦK
Figure 3: BGP determination of c∗ and g∗ in the general case
Figures 1–3 might give the erroneous impression that the M2 = 0-curve always intersects
the horizontal axis at g∗ = λL/ (1 + α). This property is true for 0 ≤ φZ ≤ φK , but might
cease to be valid if φZ > φK holds provided that η is sufficiently large. More specifically, for
the limiting case g∗ → λL/ (1 + α) we obtain
Λ0 → 0, Λ1 → αλL
1 + α
[
(φK − φZ)
(
α2 + η
)
+ αφZ
]
so that the quadratic equation (E.25) simplifies to
α2φZ (1− α) (c∗)2 + αλL
1 + α
[
(φK − φZ)
(
α2 + η
)
+ αφZ
]
c∗ = 0.
Solving for c∗ we obtain the following two roots:
c∗ = 0, c∗ = −
[
(φK − φZ)
(
α2 + η
)
+ αφZ
]
αλL
(1 + α)α2φZ (1− α) .
The economically meaningful solution of the quadratic equation (E.25) exhibits the property
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that c∗ > 0 holds for g∗ < λL/ (1 + α), and that c∗ converges to a nonnegative value for
g∗ → λL/ (1 + α). This, in turn, implies that the function (E.29) has the following properties:
lim
g∗→λL/(1+α)
c∗|M2=0 =

0 for Θ> 0,
−
[
(φK − φZ)
(
α2 + η
)
+ αφZ
]
αλL
(1 + α)α2φZ (1− α) > 0 for Θ< 0,
where
Θ ≡ (φK − φZ)
(
α2 + η
)
+ αφZ .
Hence, if
η > α (1− α) and φZ >
φK
(
α2 + η
)
η − α (1− α)
hold, then Θ< 0 so that the M2 = 0-curve does not intersect the horizontal axis at g
∗ =
λL/ (1 + α).
The main message of the considerations made above can be expressed as follows: If the
positively sloped M1 = 0-curve and the negatively sloped M2 = 0-curve intersect, then the
point of intersection is the unique steady state. In other words, if a steady state exists, then it
is unique.
E.2 The effect of changes in η and φZ
E.2.1 The effect of changes in η in the special cases φZ = 0 and φZ = φK
Special case φZ = 0: The steady-state values g
∗ and c∗ are given by (E.14),
g∗ =
σS (αλL− ρ)
1 + ασS
, c∗ =
α
[(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ]
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)
.
It is obvious that a rise in the status parameter η causes c∗ to decrease, but leaves g∗ unchanged:
∂g∗
∂η
= 0,
∂c∗
∂η
= −α
[(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ]
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)2
< 0.
In graphical terms (see Figure 1), a rise in η (from η1 to η2) causes the negatively sloped M2 = 0-
line to rotate counterclockwise and the positively sloped M1 = 0-line to rotate clockwise around
the corresponding points of intersection with the horizontal axis. The rotating M1 = 0- and
M2 = 0-lines always intersect at the same growth rate g
∗ irrespective of the magnitude of
the status parameter η. The effects of changes in η on the steady-state values of the other
endogenous variables is summarized in Proposition 2.
Special case φZ = φK : The steady-state values g
∗ and c∗ are given by (E.32),
g∗ =
σS [(α+ η)λL− ρ]
1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]
, c∗ =
(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ
α {1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]} .
Assumption (E.13) ensures that g∗ > 0. Assumption (E.9) is sufficient for c∗ > 0. According to
(C.22) a rise in the status parameter η causes g∗ to increase and c∗ to decrease. The validity
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of this result is easily confirmed by the graphical analysis (see Figure 2). A rise in η (from η1
to η2) causes the positively sloped M1 = 0-curve to shift downwards, while the position of the
negatively sloped M2 = 0-line remains unchanged. Consequently, g
∗ rises, while c∗ falls. The
effects of changes in η on the steady-state values of the other endogenous variables is summarized
in Proposition 1.
E.2.2 The effects of changes in η and φZ in the general case φZ > 0
The solutions (E.6) and (E.7), g∗ = Πg (η, φK , φZ) and c∗ = Πc (η, φK , φZ), satisfy (E.2)–(E.5)
so that
M1 (Π
g (η, φK , φZ) ,Π
c (η, φK , φZ) , η, φK , φZ) = 0,
M2 (Π
g (η, φK , φZ) ,Π
c (η, φK , φZ) , η, φK , φZ) = 0.
It is obvious that the partial derivatives are determined by the following system of equations:
∂M1
∂g∗
∂g∗
∂var
+
∂M1
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂var
+
∂M1
∂var
= 0, var = η, φK , φZ ,
∂M2
∂g∗
∂g∗
∂var
+
∂M2
∂c∗
∂c∗
∂var
+
∂M2
∂var
= 0, var = η, φK , φZ .
Please note that the partial derivatives of M1 and M2 are evaluated at (g
∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ) =
(Πg (η, φK , φZ) ,Π
c (η, φK , φZ) , η, φK , φZ). In other words, we consider the following expres-
sions: ∂Mj/∂ω|M1=M2=0, ω = g∗, c∗, η, φK , and φZ . Solving for ∂g∗/∂var and ∂c∗/∂var we
obtain
∂g∗
∂var
=
1
Ψ
(
∂M2
∂c∗
∂M1
∂var
− ∂M1
∂c∗
∂M2
∂var
)
, (E.40)
∂c∗
∂var
=
1
Ψ
(
−∂M2
∂g∗
∂M1
∂var
+
∂M1
∂g∗
∂M2
∂var
)
, (E.41)
where
Ψ ≡ ∂M1
∂c∗
∂M2
∂g∗
− ∂M1
∂g∗
∂M2
∂c∗
. (E.42)
The partial derivatives of M1 and M2 are given by (E.20)–(E.24) and (E.33)–(E.37). Recall
that in (E.40), (E.41), and (E.42) these partial derivatives of M1 and M2 are evaluated at
(g∗, c∗, η, φK , φZ) = (Πg (η, φK , φZ) ,Πc (η, φK , φZ) , η, φK , φZ).
It follows from (E.20), (E.21), and (E.39) that
∂M1
∂g∗
< 0,
∂M1
∂c∗
> 0,
∂M2
∂c∗
> 0 (E.43)
hold at the steady state. From (E.33) it is obvious that
φZ ≥ φK ⇒ ∂M2
∂g∗
> 0. (E.44)
Using (E.42)–(E.44) we obtain
φZ ≥ φK ⇒ Ψ > 0. (E.45)
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In order to determine the sign of Ψ for the case φZ < φK we make use of the fact that Ψ can
be expressed as
Ψ =
η
[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ (1− α2σS)] (λL− g∗) [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) g∗]
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
+ α
(
1 + σSα
)
+
ηφ2Z (1− α)α2σSc∗ (λL+ c∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
. (E.46)
Equation (E.46) implies that
φZ < φK ⇒ φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ (1− α2σS) > 0⇒ Ψ > 0. (E.47)
From (E.45) and (E.47) it follows that
Ψ > 0 for φZ ≥ 0. (E.48)
The effects of changes in φZ on the steady state are summarized in Proposition 3. The effects
of changes in η on the BGP are described by the following proposition that is not included in
the main text.
Proposition 4. If φZ > 0, then changes in the intensity of the quest for status as measured by
the parameter η affect the BGP as follows:
∂g∗
∂η
> 0,
∂v∗
∂η
> 0 for v = LA, ε
K , εZ , r + εK ,
pi
pA
+ εZ ,
∂v∗
∂η
< 0 for v = LY ,
C
Y
,
pi
pA
,
sgn
[
∂ (C/K)∗
∂η
]
= −sgn [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ (1− α2σS)] ,
sgn
(
∂v∗
∂η
)
= −sgn [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ] for v = Y
K
, r, p,
sgn
(
∂v∗
∂η
)
= sgn
[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ] for v = x
LY
, pA,
w
A
,
sgn
(
∂ [K/ (K + pAA)]
∗
∂η
)
= sgn (φK − φZ) .
Proof: Substitution of (E.20), (E.21), (E.22), (E.33), (E.34), and (E.35) into (E.40) and
(E.41) yields
∂g∗
∂η
=
1
Ψ
φZασ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) , (E.49)
∂c∗
∂η
= − 1
Ψ
[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ (1− α2σS)] c∗ (λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] . (E.50)
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Using the last two equations and (C.2) we obtain
∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η
=
∂g∗
∂η
+
∂c∗
∂η
= − 1
Ψ
[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ] c∗ (λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] . (E.51)
From (E.49), (E.50), and (E.51) it follows that
∂g∗
∂η
> 0 for φZ > 0,
sgn
(
∂c∗
∂η
)
= −sgn [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ (1− α2σS)] ,
sgn
[
∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η
]
= −sgn [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ] .
The last results together with (C.1)–(C.17) imply that
∂L∗A
∂η
=
1
λ
∂g∗
∂η
=
1
Ψ
φZασ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗)
λ [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] > 0,
∂L∗Y
∂η
= −∂L
∗
A
∂η
= − 1
Ψ
φZασ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗)
λ [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] < 0,
∂r∗
∂η
= α2
∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η
= − 1
Ψ
α
[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ] c∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) ,
∂p∗
∂η
= α
∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η
= − 1
Ψ
[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ] c∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) ,
∂ (x/LY )
∗
∂η
= − 1
1− α
[(
Y
K
)∗]−(2−α)/(1−α) ∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η
,
∂ (pi/pA)
∗
∂η
= −α∂g
∗
∂η
< 0,
∂p∗A
∂η
= −α
λ
[(
Y
K
)∗]−1/(1−α) ∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η
,
∂ (w/A)∗
∂η
= −α
[(
Y
K
)∗]−1/(1−α) ∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η
,
∂
[
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗]
∂η
=
1
σS
∂g∗
∂η
=
1
Ψ
φZαc
∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) > 0,
∂
[
(pi/pA)
∗ +
(
εZ
)∗]
∂η
=
1
σS
∂g∗
∂η
=
1
Ψ
φZαc
∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) > 0,
∂
(
εK
)∗
∂η
=
1
σS
∂g∗
∂η
− α2∂ (Y/K)
∗
∂η
=
1
Ψ
φK
(
1 + ασS
)
αc∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) > 0,
∂
(
εZ
)∗
∂η
=
1 + ασS
σS
∂g∗
∂η
=
1
Ψ
φZ
(
1 + ασS
)
αc∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) > 0.
To determine the effects of changes in η on the wealth share of physical capital [K/ (K + pAA)]
∗
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we use (C.2), (C.18), (E.49), and (E.51):
∂ [K/ (K + pAA)]
∗
∂η
= −
1− α
(λL− g∗)2
(
Y
K
)∗ ∂g∗
∂η
+
1− α
λL− g∗
∂ (Y/K)∗
∂η[
1 +
1− α
λL− g∗
(
Y
K
)∗]2
=
1
Ψ
(1− α) c∗ (λL− g∗)
[λL− g∗ + (1− α) (c∗ + g∗)]2 ×
×
{[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ] (λL− g∗)− φZα2σS (c∗ + g∗)}
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] . (E.52)
Since this representation of the result is not very informative, we rewrite it. Since the steady
state values g∗ and c∗ satisfy both M1 = 0 and M2 = 0, where M1 and M2 are defined by
(E.4) and (E.5), the following equations can be easily derived for η > 0, φK > 0, φZ > 0, and
φZ 6= φK :
c∗
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗ (g
∗ + c∗)
=
(
1− α2σS) g∗ − α2σSc∗ + σSρ
ηφKσS
,
c∗
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗ (g
∗ + c∗)
=
α [λL− (1 + α) g∗ − αc∗]
(φK − φZ) η .
From (C.2) and (C.12) it follows that the identical left-hand sides of these two equations equal
(C/Ω)∗. Using the fact that the right-hand sides have to be identical, too, we obtain the
following relations:
c∗ =
− [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ (1− α2σS)] g∗ + αφKσSλL− (φK − φZ)σSρ
α2σSφZ
, (E.53)
c∗ + g∗ =
− [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ] g∗ + αφKσSλL− (φK − φZ)σSρ
α2σSφZ
. (E.54)
If φZ = φK > 0 holds, then M2 = 0 implies that
c∗ =
λL− (1 + α) g∗
α
, c∗ + g∗ =
λL− g∗
α
.
If φK = 0, then it follows from M1 = 0 that
c∗ =
(
1− α2σS) g∗ + σSρ
α2σS
, c∗ + g∗ =
g∗ + σSρ
α2σS
.
These results show that (E.53) and (E.54) also hold for φK = 0 and φZ = φK > 0. Using
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(E.54), Equation (E.52) can be rewritten as
∂ [K/ (K + pAA)]
∗
∂η
=
1
Ψ
(φK − φZ) (1− α)
[λL− g∗ + (1− α) (c∗ + g∗)]2 ×
× c
∗ (λL− g∗) (λL+ σSρ)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] . (E.55)
It is obvious that
sgn
(
∂ [K/ (K + pAA)]
∗
∂η
)
= sgn (φK − φZ) . (E.56)
To determine the effects of changes in η on the average propensity to consume (C/Y )∗, we
use (C.2), (C.12), (E.49), and (E.51):
∂ (C/Y )∗
∂η
= [(Y/K)∗]−2
[
∂c∗
∂η
(
Y
K
)∗
− c∗∂ (Y/K)
∗
∂η
]
= − 1
Ψ
{[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ] g∗ + φZα2σS (c∗ + g∗)} c∗ (λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] (c∗ + g∗)2
. (E.57)
Using (E.54), Equation (E.57) can be rewritten as
∂ (C/Y )∗
∂η
= − 1
Ψ
[
φKσ
S (αλL− ρ) + φZσSρ
]
c∗ (λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] (c∗ + g∗)2
< 0. (E.58)
Note that Assumption (E.13), αλL− ρ > 0, is sufficient for the positive sign of the numerator
so that ∂ (C/Y )∗ /∂η < 0 holds. Equation (E.58), in turn, implies that the average propensity
to save depends positively on η:
∂ [1− (C/Y )∗]
∂η
=
1
Ψ
[
φKσ
S (αλL− ρ) + φZσSρ
]
c∗ (λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] (c∗ + g∗)2
> 0.
The results given above can be summarized as follows:
∂v∗
∂η
> 0 for v = g, LA, ε
K , εZ , r + εK ,
pi
pA
+ εZ ,
∂v∗
∂η
< 0 for v = LY ,
C
Y
,
pi
pA
,
sgn
(
∂c∗
∂η
)
= −sgn [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ (1− α2σS)] ,
sgn
(
∂v∗
∂η
)
= −sgn [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ] for v = Y
K
, r, p,
sgn
(
∂v∗
∂η
)
= sgn
[
φK
(
1 + ασS
)− φZ] for v = x
LY
, pA,
w
A
,
sgn
(
∂ [K/ (K + pAA)]
∗
∂η
)
= sgn (φK − φZ) . 
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F The stability properties of the steady state
F.1 The derivation of the Jacobian and the conditions for saddlepoint sta-
bility
The dynamic evolution of the variables K, C, A, and LA is governed by the four differential
equations (33), (34), (46), (47), where C/Ω is given by (38). For convenience, we restate these
equations here:
A˙
A
= λLA, (F.1)
K˙
K
=
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
− C
K
, (F.2)
C˙
C
= σS
{
α2
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
+ φKη
C
Ω
− ρ
}
, (F.3)
L˙A = (L− LA)
{
− (1− α)
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
+
C
K
+ λLA − λ (L− LA) + (φK − φZ) η
α
C
Ω
}
(F.4)
with
C
Ω
=
C
K
φK + φZ
1− α
λ (L− LA)
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α) . (F.5)
Introducing the definitions
c ≡ C
K
, a ≡ A
K
, (F.6)
we obtain [
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
= a1−α (L− LA)1−α ,
C
Ω
=
c
φK + φZ (1− α)λ−1a1−α (L− LA)−α
.
Using the last two equations, the differential equations (F.2)–(F.4) can be written as follows:
K˙
K
= a1−α (L− LA)1−α − c, (F.7)
C˙
C
= σS
[
α2a1−α (L− LA)1−α + φKηc
φK + φZ (1− α)λ−1a1−α (L− LA)−α
− ρ
]
, (F.8)
L˙A = (L− LA)
{
− (1− α) a1−α (L− LA)1−α + 2λLA − λL
+
[
1 +
(φK − φZ) ηα−1
φK + φZ (1− α)λ−1a1−α (L− LA)−α
]
c
}
. (F.9)
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Substituting (F.1), (F.7), and (F.8) into
c˙
c
=
C˙
C
− K˙
K
and
a˙
a
=
A˙
A
− K˙
K
yields the following differential equations for c and a:
c˙ = c
{
− (1− σSα2) a1−α (L− LA)1−α
+
[
1 +
σSφKη
φK + φZ (1− α)λ−1a1−α (L− LA)−α
]
c− σSρ
}
, (F.10)
a˙ = a
[
λLA − a1−α (L− LA)1−α + c
]
. (F.11)
The differential equations (F.10), (F.9), and (F.11) have the following general form:
c˙ = c˙ (c, LA, a) , L˙A = L˙A (c, LA, a) , a˙ = a˙ (c, LA, a) .
The steady-state values c∗, L∗A, and a
∗ satisfy the following equations:
0 = c˙ (c∗, L∗A, a
∗) , 0 = L˙A (c∗, L∗A, a
∗) , 0 = a˙ (c∗, L∗A, a
∗) .
To discuss the stability properties of the steady state, we have to calculate the Jacobian
M =
 m11 m12 m13m21 m22 m23
m31 m32 m33
 ≡

∂c˙
∂c
∂c˙
∂LA
∂c˙
∂a
∂L˙A
∂c
∂L˙A
∂LA
∂L˙A
∂a
∂a˙
∂c
∂a˙
∂LA
∂a˙
∂a

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(c,LA,a)=(c∗,L∗A,a∗)
.
The characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian M is given by
0 = z3 − trace (M) z2
+ (m11m22 −m12m21 +m11m33 −m13m31 +m22m33 −m23m32) z
−det (M) , (F.12)
where
trace (M) = m11 +m22 +m33, (F.13)
det (M) = m11m22m33 −m11m23m32 +m12m23m31
−m12m21m33 +m13m21m32 −m13m22m31. (F.14)
It is well known that the roots of the characteristic polynomial z1, z2, and z3 satisfy the following
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equations:
trace (M) = z1 + z3 + z2, (F.15)
det (M) = z1z2z3. (F.16)
Since the system of the three differential equations involves two jump variables (c ≡ C/K
and LA) and one state variable (a ≡ A/K), the steady state (c∗, L∗A, a∗) exhibits saddlepoint
stability if one of the three roots is a negative real number, while the two other roots are either
positive real numbers or complex numbers with positive real parts. From (F.15) and (F.16) it
follows that a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for saddlepoint stability is given by
det (M) < 0 and trace (M) > 0. (F.17)
Proof: i) If all three roots are real numbers, then the condition det (M) = z1z2z3 < 0 implies
either that one root is strictly negative, while the other two roots are strictly positive (z1 < 0,
z2 > 0, and z3 > 0) or that all three roots are strictly negative (z1 < 0, z2 < 0, and z3 < 0).
Obviously, the condition trace(M) = z1 + z3 + z2 > 0 rules out the latter case. ii) If only one
out of the three roots is real, while the two other roots are a complex number z2 = δ1 + δ2i
and its complex conjugate z3 = δ1 − δ2i, δ2 6= 0, then the condition det (M) = z1
(
δ21 + δ
2
2
)
< 0
implies that the real number is strictly negative (z1 < 0), while the real part of the complex
number and its complex conjugate, Re(z2) = Re(z3) = δ1, may be of either sign. In this case,
the condition trace(M) = z1 + 2δ1 > 0 rules out that Re(z2) = Re(z3) = δ1 ≤ 0. iii) From i)
and ii) it follows that if the condition “det (M) < 0 and trace(M) > 0” is satisfied, then one of
the three roots is a negative real number (z1 < 0), while the two other roots are either positive
real numbers (z2 > 0 and z3 > 0) or a complex number z2 = δ1 + δ2i and its complex conjugate
z3 = δ1 − δ2i, with Re(z2) = Re(z3) = δ1 > 0. This, in turn, implies that “det (M) < 0 and
trace(M) > 0” is a sufficient condition for saddlepoint stability. 
The stable arm of the linearized system is given by c (t)LA (t)
a (t)
 =
 c
∗
L∗A
a∗
+D1
 e11e21
1
 ez1t,
where (e11, e21, 1)
T denotes an eigenvector of the Jacobian M that corresponds to the eigenvalue
z1 < 0, and where D1 is an undetermined coefficient. From the initial condition a (0) = a0 ≡
A (0) /K (0) it follows that D1 = a0 − a∗.
The eigenvector (e11, e21, 1)
T satisfies the following system of equations expressed in matrix
form:  m11 m12 m13m21 m22 m23
m31 m32 m33

 e11e21
1
 = z1
 e11e21
1
 .
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Simple transformations yield the following three equations for the determination of two variables:
(m11 − z1) e11 +m12e21 = −m13,
m21e11 + (m22 − z1) e21 = −m23,
m31e11 +m32e21 = − (m33 − z1) .
There exists a unique solution for e11 and e21 that can be expressed in three equivalent ways:
e11 =
−m13 (m22 − z1) +m12m23
(m11 − z1) (m22 − z1)−m12m21
=
m12 (m33 − z1)−m13m32
(m11 − z1)m32 −m12m31
=
m23m32 − (m22 − z1) (m33 − z1)
(m22 − z1)m31 −m21m32 ,
e21 =
−m23 (m11 − z1) +m13m21
(m11 − z1) (m22 − z1)−m12m21
=
m13m31 − (m11 − z1) (m33 − z1)
(m11 − z1)m32 −m12m31
=
(m33 − z1)m21 −m23m31
(m22 − z1)m31 −m21m32 .
The stable arm exhibits the following properties:
a (t)− a∗ = (a0 − a∗) ez1t,
c (t)− c∗ = (a0 − a∗) e11ez1t = e11 [a (t)− a∗] ,
LA (t)− L∗A = (a0 − a∗) e21ez1t = e21 [a (t)− a∗] .
The last three equations imply that
c (t)− c∗ = e11
e21
[LA (t)− L∗A] .
This equation describes the comovement of LA (t) and c (t) during the transitional dynamics.
By tedious calculations it can be shown that the elements of the Jacobian are given by the
following expressions:
m11 =
[
1 +
σSφKη
φK + φZ (1− α)λ−1 (a∗)1−α
(
L− L∗A
)−α
]
c∗,
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m12 = (1− α) c∗ (a∗)1−α (L− L∗A)−α−1 ×
×
(1− σSα2) (L− L∗A)− ηφKφZασ
Sλ−1c∗[
φK + φZ (1− α)λ−1 (a∗)1−α
(
L− L∗A
)−α]2
 ,
m13 = − (1− α) c∗ (a∗)−α (L− L∗A)−α ×
×
(1− σSα2) (L− L∗A) + ηφKφZ (1− α)σ
Sλ−1c∗[
φK + φZ (1− α)λ−1 (a∗)1−α
(
L− L∗A
)−α]2
 ,
m21 = (L− L∗A)
[
1 +
(φK − φZ) ηα−1
φK + φZ (1− α)λ−1 (a∗)1−α
(
L− L∗A
)−α
]
,
m22 = (L− L∗A)
[
(1− α)2 (a∗)1−α (L− L∗A)−α + 2λ
]
−(φK − φZ)φZη (1− α)λ
−1c∗ (a∗)1−α (L− L∗A)−α[
φK+φZ (1− α)λ−1 (a∗)1−α
(
L− L∗A
)−α]2 ,
m23 = − (1− α)2 (a∗)−α (L− L∗A)2−α
−(φK − φZ)φZηα
−1 (1− α)2 λ−1c∗ (a∗)−α (L− L∗A)1−α[
φK+φZ (1− α)λ−1 (a∗)1−α
(
L− L∗A
)−α]2 ,
m31 = a
∗,
m32 = a
∗
[
λ+ (1− α) (a∗)1−α (L− L∗A)−α
]
,
m33 = − (1− α) (a∗)1−α (L− L∗A)1−α .
From (50) and (51) or (E.2)–(E.5) it follows that the steady state values g∗ and c∗ ≡ (C/K)∗
satisfy the equations:
− (1− α2σS) g∗ + σS
α2 + φKη
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗ (g
∗ + c∗)
 c∗ = σSρ, (F.18)
(1 + α) g∗ +
1
α
α2 + (φK − φZ) η
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗ (g
∗ + c∗)
 c∗ = λL. (F.19)
Since this system of equations determines only the steady state values g∗ and c∗, it will be useful
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to express the elements of the Jacobian not as functions of c∗, L∗A, and a
∗, but as functions of
g∗ and c∗ only. According to (F.11), the equation 0 = a˙ (c∗, L∗A, a
∗) implies that
(a∗)1−α (L− L∗A)1−α = λL∗A + c∗.
From the steady-state version of (F.1) it follows that
g∗ =
(
A˙/A
)∗
= λL∗A.
Using the last two equations we obtain the following representations for L∗A and a
∗:
L∗A =
g∗
λ
,
a∗ =
λ (g∗ + c∗)1/(1−α)
λL− g∗ .
Using the last two equations, the elements of the Jacobian can be rewritten as:
m11 =
[
1 +
σSφKη (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)
]
c∗,
m12 =
(1− α)λc∗ (g∗ + c∗)
λL− g∗
{
1− σSα2 − ηφKφZασ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗)
[φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
}
,
m13 = −(1− α) c
∗ (λL− g∗)
λ (g∗ + c∗)α/(1−α)
{
1− σSα2 + ηφKφZ (1− α)σ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗)
[φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
}
,
m21 =
λL− g∗
λ
[
1 +
(φK − φZ) ηα−1 (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)
]
,
m22 = (1− α)2 (g∗ + c∗) + 2 (λL− g∗)− (φK − φZ)φZη (1− α) c
∗ (g∗ + c∗) (λL− g∗)
[φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
,
m23 = − (λL− g
∗)2
λ2 (g∗ + c∗)α/(1−α)
{
(1− α)2 + (φK − φZ)φZηα
−1 (1− α)2 c∗ (λL− g∗)
[φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
}
,
m31 =
λ (g∗ + c∗)1/(1−α)
λL− g∗ ,
m32 =
λ2 (g∗ + c∗)1/(1−α)
(λL− g∗)2 [(λL− g
∗) + (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] ,
m33 = − (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) .
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Using these expressions it can be shown by tedious calculations that
trace (M) = c∗ + 2 (λL− g∗)− (1− α)α (g∗ + c∗)
+
φKησ
Sc∗ (λL− g∗)
φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)
+
φZ (φZ − φK) η (1− α) c∗ (λL− g∗) (g∗ + c∗)
[φK (λL− g∗) +φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
,
det (M) = − (1− α) c∗ (g∗ + c) (λL− g∗)×
×
{
α
(
1 + ασS
)
+
[(
1 + ασS
)
φK −
(
1− α2σS)φZ] η (λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]
− φZη (1− α) c
∗φK
(
1 + ασS
)
(λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
+
φ2Zη (1− α) c∗
[
(λL− g∗) + α2σS (g∗ + c∗)]
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
}
.
Using (E.54),
c∗ + g∗ =
− [φK (1 + ασS)− φZ] g∗ + αφKσSλL− (φK − φZ)σSρ
α2σSφZ
,
the last equation can be rewritten as
det (M) = − (1− α) c∗ (g∗ + c) (λL− g∗)×
×
{
α
(
1 + ασS
)
+
[(
1 + ασS
)
φK −
(
1− α2σS)φZ] η (λL− g∗)
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]
− (φK − φZ)φZη (1− α) c
∗ (λL+ σSρ)
α [φK (λL− g∗) + φZ (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)]2
}
.
For the two special cases φK = φZ on the one hand and φZ = 0, φK > 0 on the other hand,
the saddlepoint stability of the steady state can be shown analytically. The stability analysis
of the remaining cases requires the use of numerical calculations.
F.2 The special case φK = φZ
From Proposition 1 it follows that if φK = φZ , then the steady state values g
∗ and c∗ are given
by
g∗ =
σS [(α+ η)λL− ρ]
1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]
,
c∗ =
λL− (1 + α) g∗
α
=
(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ
α {1 + σS [α+ η (1 + α)]} .
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The last equation implies that
c∗ + g∗ = α−1 (λL− g∗) .
Using these results, the expressions for the elements of the Jacobian in the special case φK = φZ
can be written as:
m11 =
(
1 + ηασS
)
c∗,
m12 =
(1− α)λc∗
α
[
1− σSα2 − ηα
3σSc∗
λL− g∗
]
,
m13 = −(1− α)α
α/(1−α)c∗ (λL− g∗)(1−2α)/(1−α)
λ
[
1− σSα2 + η (1− α)α
2σSc∗
λL− g∗
]
,
m21 =
λL− g∗
λ
,
m22 =
1 + α2
α
(λL− g∗) ,
m23 = −(1− α)
2 αα/(1−α) (λL− g∗)(2−3α)/(1−α)
λ2
,
m31 =
λ (λL− g∗)α/(1−α)
α1/(1−α)
,
m32 =
λ2 (λL− g∗)α/(1−α)
α(2−α)/(1−α)
,
m33 = −(1− α) (λL− g
∗)
α
.
These expressions imply that
trace (M) =
(
1 + ηασS
)
c∗ + (1 + α) (λL− g∗) ,
det (M) = − (1− α) [(1 + ασS)+ η (1 + α)σS] c∗ (λL− g∗)2 .
Taking into account that λL−g∗ = λ (L− L∗A) = λL∗Y > 0, it is obvious that trace(M) > 0 and
det (M) < 0. Hence, the sufficient condition for the saddlepoint stability of the steady state
(c∗, L∗A, a
∗) given by (F.17) is satisfied.
F.3 The special case φZ = 0 and φK > 0
From Proposition 2 or the equations given in (E.14) it follows that
g∗ =
σS (αλL− ρ)
1 + ασS
,
c∗ =
α [λL− (1 + α) g∗]
α2 + η
=
α
[(
1− α2σS)λL+ (1 + α)σSρ]
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)
.
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These two results imply that
c∗ + g∗ =
αλL− (α− η) g∗
α2 + η
=
(
1 + ησS
)
αλL+ (α− η)σSρ
(α2 + η) (1 + ασS)
,
λL− g∗ = λL+ σ
Sρ
1 + ασS
.
Using the results given above, the elements of the Jacobian corresponding to the special case
φZ = 0 and φK > 0 can be expressed as follows:
m11 =
(
1 + ησS
)
c∗,
m12 =
(
1− σSα2) (1− α)λc∗ (g∗ + c∗)
λL− g∗ ,
m12 =
(
1− σSα2) (1− α)λc∗ (g∗ + c∗)
λL− g∗ ,
m13 = −
(
1− σSα2) (1− α) c∗ (λL− g∗)
λ (g∗ + c∗)α/(1−α)
,
m21 =
α+ η
αλ
(λL− g∗) ,
m22 = (1− α)2 (g∗ + c∗) + 2 (λL− g∗) ,
m23 = − (λL− g
∗)2
λ2 (g∗ + c∗)α/(1−α)
(1− α)2 ,
m31 =
λ (g∗ + c∗)1/(1−α)
λL− g∗ ,
m32 =
λ2 (g∗ + c∗)1/(1−α)
(λL− g∗)2 [(λL− g
∗) + (1− α) (g∗ + c∗)] ,
m33 = − (1− α) (g∗ + c∗) .
It can be shown that
trace (M) =
{
α
[(
1− α2σS)+ α (1 + α)]+ η [(1 + ασS) (1− α2σS)+ 1 + α3σS]}λL
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)
+
{
4α2 + (1− α)2 α+ η [2 + α (1− α) + σSα (1 + α)]}σSρ
(1 + ασS) (α2 + η)
,
det (M) = −(1− α)
(
α2 + η
) (
1 + ασS
)
α
c∗ (g∗ + c∗) (λL− g∗) < 0.
It is obvious that det (M) < 0. Assumption (E.9), 1− α2σS > 0, is sufficient for trace(M) > 0.
Hence, the sufficient condition for the saddlepoint stability of the steady state (c∗, L∗A, a
∗) given
by (F.17) is satisfied.
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F.4 The general case φZ > 0
We now analyze also situations in which neither φZ = 0 nor φZ = 1 holds. More specifically, in
the following illustrations we set φK = 1 and consider alternative values of φZ allowing for both
0 ≤ φZ ≤ φK and φZ > φK . In addition, we also consider alternative values of η. In contrast
to φZ and η we do not alter the rest of the parameters. The following parameter settings are
used for all illustrations:
α = 1/3, ξ = 1⇒ σS = 1/θ = 1/2, ρ = 0.02, L = 300× 106, λ = 5.0× 10−10.
The values in the following table correspond to the case η = 0.1:
φZ g
∗ z1 z2 z3
0.0 1.29% −0.06640 0.12200 0.38946
0.1 1.37% −0.06560 0.12638 0.39522
0.2 1.46% −0.06535 0.13024 0.40329
0.3 1.53% −0.06567 0.13352 0.41331
0.4 1.59% −0.06653 0.13622 0.42464
0.5 1.65% −0.06778 0.13840 0.43659
0.6 1.70% −0.06930 0.14015 0.44856
0.7 1.74% −0.07096 0.14156 0.46013
0.8 1.77% −0.07266 0.14271 0.47104
0.9 1.80% −0.07434 0.14366 0.48117
1.0 1.82% −0.07595 0.14445 0.49049
2.0 1.95% −0.08736 0.14835 0.54946
10.0 2. 06% −0.10297 0.15182 0.62142
100.0 2.08% −0.10739 0.152 64 0.64091
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In the next table we set η = 0.5:
φZ g
∗ z1 z2 z3
0.0 1.29% −0.04738 0.08198 0.31131
0.1 1.45% −0.04795 0.08713 0.30888
0.2 1. 64% −0.04851 0.09295 0.30680
0.3 1.84% −0.04909 0.09952 0.30553
0.4 2.07% −0.04977 0.10680 0.30587
0.5 2.33% −0.05071 0.11463 0.30908
0.6 2.59% −0.05217 0.12256 0.31694
0.7 2.86% −0.05453 0.12994 0.33126
0.8 3.10% −0.05809 0.136 18 0.35291
0.9 3. 32% −0.06286 0.14108 0.38092
1.0 3.50% −0.06856 0.144 84 0.41288
2.0 4.16% −0.11842 0.15902 0.66893
10.0 4.46% −0.17608 0.16759 0.95593
100.0 4.50% −0.18988 0.16921 1.02504
It is obvious that all cases considered in the two tables exhibit saddlepoint stability. Moreover,
both tables illustrate the statement of Proposition 3 that g∗ depends positively on φZ . Finally, a
comparison of the two tables illustrates the statement of Proposition 4 that g∗ depends positively
on η, regardless of whether 0 < φZ ≤ φK or φZ > φK .
G Decentralized versus socially planned solution of an economy
with relative wealth preferences
In this subsection we analyze whether there exists the theoretical possibility that the well-known
distortions of the standard R&D-based growth model of the Romer (1990) type are perfectly
offset by the externalities that result from relative wealth preferences so that the decentralized
solution coincides with its socially optimal counterpart. Our results can be summarized by the
following proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose that the lifetime utility of the representative household is given by∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
C1−θ − 1
1− θ
)
dt, θ, ρ > 0,
in the standard economy and by
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
[Ch (S)]1−θ − 1
1− θ
)
dt, S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
= ϕ
(
Ω
Ω¯
)
, ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ ≤ 0,
in the economy with relative wealth preferences. Then the following results hold:
i) The socially optimal solution of the economy with relative wealth preferences coincides
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with the socially optimal solution of the economy with standard preferences.
ii) If φK > 0 and if the status parameters φZ and η happen to satisfy the conditions
φZ = ς˜φK , ς˜ ≡ 1 + α (λL− ρ)
θ (1− α)λL > 1,
η = η˜ ≡ (1− α) (θλL)
2
[(θ − α)λL+ αρ] [(θ − 1)λL+ ρ] ,
then the BGP of the decentralized economy with relative wealth preferences coincides with
the BGP of the socially planned economy. More specifically, (η, φZ) = (η˜, ς˜φK) implies
that
g∗ =
λL− ρ
θ
= gP ,(
C
K
)∗
=
(θ − α)λL+ αρ
αθ
=
(
C
K
)P
,
(
Y
K
)∗
=
λL
α
=
(
Y
K
)P
,
L∗A =
λL− ρ
θλ
= LPA,
L∗Y =
(θ − 1)λL+ ρ
θλ
= LPY ,
r∗ = αλL >
α [(θ − 1)λL+ ρ]
θ
= (pi/pA)
∗ ,
(
εK
)∗
= (1− α)λL < (1− α) θλL+ α (λL− ρ)
θ
=
(
εZ
)∗
,
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
= (pi/pA)
∗ +
(
εZ
)∗
= λL,
holds, where x∗ denotes the steady-state value of x in the decentralized economy with
relative wealth preferences, while xP denotes the common steady state value of x in the
two socially planned economies.
Proof of i)
First, we analyze the socially optimal solution of the standard model without status prefer-
ences. The benevolent social planner maximizes lifetime utility of the representative household
given by ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
C1−θ − 1
1− θ
)
dt (G.1)
by optimally choosing the time paths of C, xi, i ∈ [0, A], ki, i ∈ [0, A], LY , and LA by taking into
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account the production functions for the final good, the intermediate goods and new technologies
Y = L1−αY
∫ A
0
xαi di, (G.2)
xi = ki, i ∈ [0, A] , (G.3)
A˙ = λLAA, (G.4)
the three resource constraints
LY + LA = L, (G.5)
K =
∫ A
0
ki di, (G.6)
K˙ = Y − C, (G.7)
and the two initial conditions
A (0) = A0, K (0) = K0. (G.8)
The symmetry assumptions that are employed in the production function for final goods (G.2)
and the production functions for the intermediate goods (G.3) imply that the optimal plan of
the social planner exhibits the following property:
xi = x, i ∈ [0, A] ,
ki = k = x, i ∈ [0, A] .
Substituting these equations into the resource constraint for aggregate capital input (G.6) we
obtain
K = Ak = Ax.
The last equations together with the resource constraint for employment (G.5) imply the fol-
lowing results for output of the final good:
Y = L1−αY
∫ A
0
xαi di = L
1−α
Y Ax
α = (L− LA)1−αAkα = Kα [A (L− LA)]1−α . (G.9)
The results given above imply that the socially optimal paths of C, LA, K, and A can be
determined by means of the following relatively simple optimization problem: Maximize lifetime
utility of the representative household given by (G.1) by optimally choosing the time paths of
C and LA subject to the aggregate resource constraint
K˙ = Kα [A (L− LA)]1−α − C, (G.10)
the production function for blueprints (G.4), and the two initial conditions (G.8).
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The current value Hamiltonian is given by
H =
C1−θ − 1
1− θ + µK
{
Kα [A (L− LA)]1−α − C
}
+ µAλLAA.
The necessary optimality conditions for an interior solution are given by
∂H
∂C
= C−θ − µK = 0, (G.11)
∂H
∂LA
= −µK (1− α)A
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
+ µAλA = 0, (G.12)
µ˙K = ρµK − ∂H
∂K
= −µK
{
α
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
− ρ
}
, (G.13)
µ˙A = ρµA − ∂H
∂A
= −µA
{
µK
µA
(1− α)
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
(L− LA) + λLA − ρ
}
. (G.14)
The transversality conditions are given by
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµKK = 0, lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµAA = 0. (G.15)
From the necessary optimality conditions (G.11)–(G.14) it follows that
µK = C
−θ, (G.16)
µ˙K
µK
= −θ C˙
C
, (G.17)
µA = µK (1− α)λ−1
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
= (1− α)λ−1
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
C−θ, (G.18)
µ˙A
µ˙A
= α
K˙
K
− αA˙
A
+
α
L− LA L˙A − θ
C˙
C
. (G.19)
Substituting (G.16)–(G.19) into (G.13)–(G.14) yields
C˙
C
=
1
θ
{
α
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
− ρ
}
, (G.20)
α
K˙
K
− αA˙
A
+
α
L− LA L˙A − θ
C˙
C
= − (λL− ρ) . (G.21)
From (G.4) and (G.10) it follows that
K˙
K
=
[
K
A (L− LA)
]−(1−α)
− C
K
, (G.22)
A˙
A
= λLA. (G.23)
Substituting (G.20), (G.22), and (G.23) into (G.21), we obtain the following differential equation
73
for employment in the R&D sector:
L˙A = (L− LA)
(
λLA − λL
α
+
C
K
)
. (G.24)
Using (G.16) and (G.18), the transversality conditions (G.15) can be expressed as follows:
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtC−θK = 0, lim
t→∞ e
−ρt (1− α)λ−1
[
K
A (L− LA)
]α
C−θA = 0. (G.25)
The considerations made above show that the dynamic evolution of C, LA, K, and A in
the socially planned economy is determined by the four differential equations (G.20), (G.24),
(G.22), and (G.23), the initial conditions (G.8), and the transversality conditions (G.25).
This system exhibits the property that there exists a BGP characterized by the following
features:
LA = constant,
C
K
= constant,
K
A
= constant,
C˙
C
=
K˙
K
=
A˙
A
= constant.
In the following we denote the steady-state values of an arbitrary variable x in the socially
planned economy by xP , where the superscript P stands for “Planner”. The four differential
equations (G.20), (G.24), (G.22), and (G.23) imply that
gP =
1
θ
α
[(
K
A
)P 1
L− LPA
]−(1−α)
− ρ
 ,
0 = λLPA −
λL
α
+
(
C
K
)P
,
gP =
[(
K
A
)P 1
L− LPA
]−(1−α)
−
(
C
K
)P
,
gP = λLPA,
where gP denotes the common growth rate of C, A, and K along the BGP. Solving for gP ,
(C/K)P , LPA, and (K/A)
P we obtain
gP =
λL− ρ
θ
, (G.26)(
C
K
)P
=
(θ − α)λL+ αρ
αθ
, (G.27)
LPA =
λL− ρ
λθ
, (G.28)(
K
A
)P
=
(θ − 1)λL+ ρ
λθ
(
λL
α
)−1/(1−α)
. (G.29)
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From (G.5) and (G.9) it then follows that
LPY =
(θ − 1)λL+ ρ
λθ
, (G.30)
(
Y
K
)P
=
[(
K
A
)P 1
L− LPA
]−(1−α)
=
λL
α
. (G.31)
The transversality conditions (G.25) require that the expressions
e−ρtC−θK and e−ρt (1− α)λ−1 {K/ [A (L− LA)]}αC−θA
converge to zero for t→∞. Along the BGP the common constant rate of growth of these two
expressions is given by
−ρ− θgP + gP = −(θ − 1)λL+ ρ
θ
= −λLPY . (G.32)
From (G.26), (G.27), (G.28), (G.30), and (G.32) it then follows that if ρ satisfies the condition
that
(1− θ)λL < ρ < λL, (G.33)
then
gP > 0,
(
C
K
)P
> 0, LPA > 0, and L
P
Y > 0
hold and both transversality conditions are satisfied.
Now we proceed with the socially optimal solution of an economy with relative wealth pref-
erences. A sensible comparison with the status-free economy in which the instantaneous utility
function is given by
u (C) =
C1−θ − 1
1− θ ,
requires that we restrict our attention to relative wealth preferences that are obtained by setting
ξ = 1 in (42):
u (C, S) =
[Ch (S)]1−θ − 1
1− θ , S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
= ϕ
(
Ω
Ω¯
)
, ϕ′ > 0, ϕ′′ ≤ 0.
According to (44) and (45) these specifications of u (C, S) and S
(
Ω, Ω¯
)
imply that
χ = S (Ω,Ω) = ϕ (1) , σS = 1/θ, η = β ≡ h
′ [ϕ (1)]ϕ′ (1)
h [ϕ (1)]
. (G.34)
In contrast to the representative household of the decentralized economy, the benevolent social
planner takes into account the externalities resulting from relative wealth preferences. It is
optimal for the social planner to assign identical choices to households that are identical in
every respect so that Ωj = Ω¯ holds for each household j at any time t. Taking into account
that S (Ω,Ω) = ϕ (1) ≡ χ holds, the optimization problem of the social planner can be written
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as follows: Maximize lifetime utility of the representative consumer
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
[Ch (χ)]1−θ − 1
1− θ
)
dt
by optimally choosing the time paths of C and LA and taking into account the economy’s re-
source constraint (G.10), the production function for blueprints (G.4), and the initial conditions
(G.8). It is easily verified that the optimal time paths of C, LA, K, and A (in contrast to the
time paths of the costate variables) are independent of the constant factor h (χ). Hence, regard-
less of whether we consider standard preferences or introduce relative wealth preferences, the
socially optimal time paths of C, LA, K, and A are determined by the four differential equa-
tions (G.20), (G.24), (G.22), and (G.23), the initial conditions (G.8), and the transversality
conditions (G.25). These results imply that the solutions for the steady-state values given by
(G.26)–(G.31) are also valid for the model with relative wealth preferences provided that ξ = 1.
In other words, the socially optimal solution of the economy with relative wealth preferences
coincides with the socially optimal solution of the economy with standard preferences.
Proof of (ii):
If ξ = 1 then σS = θ−1 and η = β [see (G.34)]. Setting σS = θ−1 in (50) and (51) yields
− (1− α2θ−1) g∗ + θ−1
α2 +
φKη
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗
[
g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗]

(
C
K
)∗
= θ−1ρ, (G.35)
(1 + α) g∗ +
1
α
α2 +
(φK − φZ) η
φK+
φZ (1− α)
λL− g∗
[
g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗]

(
C
K
)∗
= λL. (G.36)
These two equations determine the steady-state values of g and (C/K) in the decentralized
economy with relative wealth preferences. From (G.26) and (G.27) it follows that the conditions
for social optimality are given by
g∗ = gP =
λL− ρ
θ
, (G.37)(
C
K
)∗
=
(
C
K
)P
=
(θ − α)λL+ αρ
αθ
. (G.38)
Substituting these two conditions into (G.35) and (G.36) we obtain
− (1− α)αθλL+ φKη [(θ − α)λL+ αρ]
φK + φZ
(1− α) θλL
α [(θ − 1)λL+ ρ]
= 0, (G.39)
α2 (λL− ρ) + (φK − φZ) η [(θ − α)λL+ αρ]
φK + φZ
(1− α) θλL
α [λLθ − λL+ ρ]
= 0. (G.40)
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If φK = 0, then condition (G.39) simplifies to
− (1− α)αθλL = 0.
Obviously, this condition can never be satisfied. Hence, in the following we restrict our attention
to φK > 0. Introducing the definition
ς ≡ φZ
φK
,
conditions (G.39) and (G.40) can be rewritten as
− (1− α)αθλL+ η ((θ − α)λL+ αρ)
1+
ς (1− α) θλL
α ((θ − 1)λL+ ρ)
= 0,
α2 (λL− ρ) + (1− ς) η ((θ − α)λL+ αρ)
1+
ς (1− α) θλL
α (λLθ − λL+ ρ)
= 0.
Solving these two equations for η and ς and denoting the solutions by η˜ and ς˜, we obtain
ς˜ = 1 +
α (λL− ρ)
θ (1− α)λL > 1, (G.41)
η˜ =
(1− α) (θλL)2
[(θ − α)λL+ αρ] [(θ − 1)λL+ ρ] . (G.42)
If (η, φZ) = (η˜, ς˜φK) happens to hold, then by definition both g
∗ = gP and (C/K)∗ = (C/K)P
hold. Using (G.37)–(G.38), (G.41)–(G.42) as well as (C.1)–(C.18), we finally obtain(
Y
K
)∗
= g∗ +
(
C
K
)∗
=
λL
α
,
L∗A =
g∗
λ
=
λL− ρ
θλ
,
L∗Y = L− L∗A =
λL− g∗
λ
=
(θ − 1)λL+ ρ
θλ
,
r∗ = α2
(
Y
K
)∗
= αλL,(
pi
pA
)∗
= αλL∗Y =
α [(θ − 1)λL+ ρ]
θ
,
(
C
Ω
)∗
=
(
C
K
)∗
φK+ς˜φK
1− α
λL− g∗
(
Y
K
)∗ = [(θ − α)λL+ αρ] [(θ − 1)λL+ ρ]φKθ2λL ,
(
εK
)∗
= φK η˜ ×
(
C
Ω
)∗
=
1
σS
g∗ − r∗ + ρ = (1− α)λL,
(
εZ
)∗
= ς˜φK η˜ ×
(
C
Ω
)∗
=
(1− α) θλL+ α (λL− ρ)
θ
,
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r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
=
(
pi
pA
)∗
+
(
εZ
)∗
= λL,(
C
Y
)∗
=
(θ − α)λL+ αρ
θλL
= 1− α (λL− ρ)
θλL
,(
K
K + pAA
)∗
=
1
1 +
1− α
λL∗Y
(
Y
K
)∗ = α(1− (1− α) (λL− ρ)(θ − α)λL+ αρ
)
< α.
While the effective rates of return of physical capital and shares are identical,
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
= (pi/pA)
∗ +
(
εZ
)∗
= λL,
the market rates of return and the status related extra returns differ due to φZ = ς˜φK > φK :
r∗ = αλL >
α [(θ − 1)λL+ ρ]
θ
= (pi/pA)
∗ ,
(
εK
)∗
= (1− α)λL < (1− α) θλL+ α (λL− ρ)
θ
=
(
εZ
)∗ 
Illustration:
Consider the values
α = 1/3, ξ = 1⇒ σS = 1/θ = 1/2, ρ = 0.02, L = 300× 106, λ = 5.0× 10−10.
Then we have
ς˜ = 1 +
α (λL− ρ)
θ (1− α)λL ≈ 1.22,
η˜ =
(1− α) (θλL)2
[(θ − α)λL+ αρ] [(θ − 1)λL+ ρ] ≈ 1.38.
If φZ = ς˜φK and η = η˜ happen to hold, then
g∗ = gP = 6.5× 10−2,
(
C
K
)∗
=
(
C
K
)P
= 0.385,
(
Y
K
)∗
= 0.45,
(
C
Y
)∗
= 85.56× 10−2,
L∗Y = 170000000.0, L
∗
A = 130000000.0,
L∗A
L
= 43.33× 10−2,
r∗ = 5.0× 10−2,
(
pi
pA
)∗
= 2.83× 10−2,
(
εK
)∗
= 10.0× 10−2, (εZ)∗ = 12.17× 10−2,
r∗ +
(
εK
)∗
=
(
pi
pA
)∗
+
(
εZ
)∗
= 15.0× 10−2,
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(
K
K + pAA
)∗
= 22.08× 10−2,
z1 = −0.08623, z2 = 0.15703, z3 = 0.45178.
For this parameter setting (that can only hold by pure coincidence), the growth rates of the
socially planned economy and its decentralized counterpart are the same. Note that one eigen-
value of the Jacobian is negative and two are positive, which implies saddle-point stability of
the BGP.
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IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
Ulrich Schwalbe 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
IK 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
39-2011 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and  
Oliver Frör 
 
 
RESPONDENT INCENTIVES IN CONTINGENT VALUATION: THE 
ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
 
    ECO 
40-2011 Tobias Börger  
 
A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
 
    ECO 
41-2011 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
 
QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
DER DEUTSCHEN STADT- UND LANDKREISE (1999-2008) 
    IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
    
42-2012 Benjamin Schön,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
A TAXONOMY OF INNOVATION NETWORKS IK 
 
43-2012 Dirk Foremny, 
Nadine Riedel 
 
BUSINESS TAXES AND THE ELECTORAL CYCLE        ECO 
44-2012 Gisela Di Meglio, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Luis Rubalcaba 
 
VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
45-2012 Ralf Rukwid,  
Julian P. Christ 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
PRODUKTIONSCLUSTER IM BEREICH „METALL, ELEKTRO, IKT“ 
UND REGIONALE VERFÜGBARKEIT AKADEMISCHER 
FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
 
IK 
46-2012 Julian P. Christ,  
Ralf Rukwid 
INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
BRANCHENSPEZIFISCHE FORSCHUNGS- UND 
ENTWICKLUNGSAKTIVITÄT, REGIONALES 
PATENTAUFKOMMEN UND BESCHÄFTIGUNGSSTRUKTUR 
 
       IK 
47-2012 Oliver Sauter ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE AND THE 
US - IS THERE A COMMON FACTOR? 
       ECO 
48-2012 Dominik Hartmann SEN MEETS SCHUMPETER. INTRODUCING STRUCTURAL AND 
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS INTO THE HUMAN CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
 
       IK 
49-2012 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett,  
Andreas Pyka 
 
DISTAL EMBEDDING AS A TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
NETWORK FORMATION STRATEGY 
       IK 
50-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
CYCLICALITY OF REAL WAGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY: 
NEW INSIGHTS FROM WAVELET ANALYSIS 
       ECO 
51-2012 André P. Slowak DIE DURCHSETZUNG VON SCHNITTSTELLEN 
IN DER STANDARDSETZUNG: 
FALLBEISPIEL LADESYSTEM ELEKTROMOBILITÄT 
       IK 
 
52-2012 
 
Fabian Wahl 
 
WHY IT MATTERS WHAT PEOPLE THINK - BELIEFS, LEGAL 
ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
        
ECO 
 
53-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Micha Kaiser 
 
STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DEUTSCHLAND 
        
IK 
 
54-2012 
 
Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka, Seda 
Aydin, Lena Klauß, 
Fabian Stahl, Ali 
Santircioglu, Silvia 
Oberegelsbacher, 
Sheida Rashidi, Gaye 
Onan and Suna 
Erginkoç 
 
IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
 
55-2012 
 
Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
 
        
ECO 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
Ulloa, Valerie Møller 
and Alfonso Sousa-
Poza   
 
HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
HCM 
 
 
73-2013 
 
Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
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74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
 
HCM 
 
 
75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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